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JUDGE OR JURY? DETERMINING DECEPTION
OR MISREPRESENTATION UNDER THE FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Christian Stueben *
This Note explores the conflict among the federal circuit courts as to
whether a judge or jury should decide if the language contained in a
collection letter is false, misleading, or deceptive to the least sophisticated
consumer under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Some
circuits, such as the Second and Ninth Circuits, hold that this issue is a
question of law, appropriatefor the judge to decide. In contrast, the
Seventh Circuitfinds this to be a question offact, and requires the plaintiff
to submit extrinsic evidence in the form of professionalsurveys in order to
reach the jury. Other circuits, such as the Sixth Circuit, submit close cases
under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA to the jury (without requiring
extrinsic evidence), while holding that § 1692g cases are an issue of law.
This Note examines the legislative history of and case law relating to the
FDCPA and argues that all circuits should treat § 1692g and § 1692e
actions consistently, at least when the § 1692e claim is limited to the text of
the letter and no otherfacts are disputed (i.e., the collection letter "speaks
for itself'). This Note then argues that policy considerationsfavor the
Second and Ninth Circuits' approach of treating the issue as a question of
law because the need for uniform application of a federal statute is
paramount. This is especially true in the area of debt collection, because
many debt collectors utilize the same collection letters in multiple states.
Finally, this Note argues that the Seventh Circuit's requirement that a
debtor present extrinsic evidence to survive summary judgment contradicts
the purpose of the FDCPA. Because the FDCPA was designed to provide a
remedy for citizens of all means, the requirement of producing expensive
and time-consuming extrinsic evidence is a needless barrierthat thwarts
the legislative intent behind the FDCPA.

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2008, Bucknell
University. I want to thank Professor Susan Block-Lieb for her guidance. I would also like
to thank my family and friends for all of their support throughout this process.
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INTRODUCTION
Simpson & Goldstein (the Firm) is a small New York City law firm that
represents two major retailers-FIT Fashion and Bonanza Department
Stores (the Clients)-in the area of debt collection.' When the Clients'
customers (the Debtors) fail to pay their bills on time, the Clients attempt to
collect the debts directly by sending simple requests for payment to the
Debtors once a month for a period of six months. When these efforts fail,
the Clients engage the services of the Firm.
Every month, the Clients send the Firm a list containing the names,
addresses, and balances of the Debtors who are six months delinquent on
their bills. Firm staff members utilize a computer program to generate a
form letter to each Debtor. This letter informs the Debtors that the Firm
represents the Clients in the area of debt collection. The letter lists the total
amount that is overdue, but contains a disclaimer stating that no attorney
from the Firm has personally reviewed the details of the Debtors' personal
accounts. Notably, the disclaimer is printed on the back of the letter. The
mailing address and telephone number of the Firm are provided, with a
warning that the Clients could consider further action if the Debtor does not
contact the Firm. The letter is printed on firm letterhead and contains a
facsimile signature of Avery Simpson, the managing partner.
Approximately 5000 of these letters are mailed out every week to debtors
residing in every state in the United States.
In New York, if the facts concerning attorney involvement are not in
question, 2 a judge would likely determine whether the language in this
collection letter-specifically the placement and language of the disclaimer
of attorney involvement-is misleading or deceptive in violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). 3 In Florida and Texas, this issue
1. This introductory hypothetical is based on the facts from Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010).

2. If attorney involvement itself is in question, it is generally a question of fact. See,
e.g., Goins v. Brandon, 367 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D. Conn. 2005) ("What constitutes

'meaningful attorney involvement' is largely a question of fact ....

" (quoting Miller v.

Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 2003))); Sonmore v. Checkrite
Recovery Servs. Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (D. Minn. 2001) ("Whether or not

attorney involvement is meaningful so as to comport with the FDCPA is a question of
fact."); see also Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, No. C 06-02231 WHA, 2007 WL 549904, at

*9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007) (sending a dispute about meaningful attorney involvement
under § 1692e(3) and (10) to the jury).
3. See infra Part II.B. 1.
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would go to a jury. 4 In Michigan, this case would also likely go to a jury,
but a claim arising under § 1692g-which requires the debt collector to
disclose certain rights to the debtor-would go to the judge. 5 This is true
even though both claims would involve the same issue: whether the
language of a collection letter would mislead or deceive the least
sophisticated consumer. 6 Finally, in Illinois, the plaintiff would have to
introduce potentially expensive survey evidence establishing that the
collection letter contained language that actually confused its intended
recipients just to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 7 Such is the state
of disarray over the application of the FDCPA in cases in which the only
issue is whether the language of a collection letter is false, misleading, or
deceptive in violation of FDCPA §§ 1692e and g.
The debt collection industry is enormous, with third-party debt collectors
collecting over $50 billion in 2007 alone. 8 The third-party debt collection
industry employs over 200,000 people, 9 while over 400,000 are employed
as "bill and account collectors."' 0 Approximately seventy-seven percent of
U.S. families hold some type of debt." Further, the total U.S. consumer
debt was $2.483 trillion as of October 2009.12
In recent years, litigation alleging violations of the FDCPA has exploded
in the country. 13 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York saw an increase from four cases alleging violations of the FDCPA in
2002, to ninety-two in 2005, and eighty-five in just the first five months of
2006.14 WebRecon LLC-a Michigan-based research firm that provides
collection agencies with a list of debtors who have previously engaged in
consumer protection litigation, including FDCPA cases-reported that 3813
4. See generally Gonzalez, 577 F.3d 600 (sending interpretation of a substantially
similar letter to a jury); Brazier v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, No. 8:08-cv-156-t17MAP, 2009 WL 764161 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2009) (sending interpretation of the same

letter to a jury).
5. See infra Part II.A, B.2; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2006) (describing a series of
rights that the debt collector must convey to the debtor).
6. See infra Part III.A.

7. See infra Part II.C (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's
extrinsic evidence requirement).
8. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, VALUE OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTION TO THE
U.S. ECONOMY IN 2007:
SURVEY AND ANALYSIS 2 tbl.II.l (2008), available at
http://www.acainternational.org/files.aspx?p=/images/1 2546/pwc2007-final.pdf.
9. Id.at 3.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
AND WAGES, MAY 2008: BILL AND ACCOUNT COLLECTORS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/
may/oes43301 1.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
11. Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2009, at A40,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss2/2007/bull09_SCFnobkgdscreen.pdf.
12. Statistical Release, Fed. Reserve, Consumer Credit (Dec. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g 19/20091207/gl9.pdf.
13. See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 (E.D.N.Y.
2006), rev'don other grounds, 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
14. Id.
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FDCPA cases were filed nationwide in 2007, 5188 cases were filed in 2008
(a thirty-six percent increase), and 8287 cases were filed in 2009 (a sixty
percent increase). 15
Some commentators speculate that changes in
technology such as the rise in mass mailing and development of automated
calling systems have enabled debt collectors to reach millions of consumers
at a time, increasing the pool of potential litigants. 16 Several factors appear
to have contributed to this rise in litigation, including the nuanced nature of
many FDCPA requirements, application of the least sophisticated or
unsophisticated consumer standard, 17 and strict liability for violations of the
18
Act.
The recent collapse in the housing industry and the current economic
recession have only increased the numbers of Americans who are subject to
debt collection practices. Because of the recent explosion in consumer
defaults, creditors have been forced to initiate debt collection actions for
19
amounts they "would have gladly written-off a couple of years ago."'
Creditors have also lowered the debt level needed to trigger recovery
efforts. 20 Additionally, creditors are hiring third-party debt collectors more
than ever before. 2' Since third-party debt collectors are subject to the
FDCPA 2 2-but original creditors are not 23-the potential scope of FDCPA
litigation has steadily increased in recent years.
Other issues make this specific conflict ripe for resolution. Citizens in
some circuits are denied the right to a jury trial, at least on the issue of
whether the language of a collection letter itself is false or misleading under
the FDCPA. 24 The right to a jury trial in civil cases is guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, so this conflict impacts the
constitutional liberties of certain citizens. 25 Importantly, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently reversed its position on this 26issue
without discussion, sparking a lively dissent and furthering the divide.

15. WebRecon LLC, FDCPA and Other Consumer Rights Lawsuit Statistics,
http://webrecon.com/news/?p=131 (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). This represents an overall
increase of 217% in the past three years.
16. Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, Consumer Standards Under the Fair Debt
Collection PracticesAct: A Case for Regulatory Expansion, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.

232, 245 (2008).
17. These standards are fully discussed infra in Part I.C.
18. Jacobson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 138; Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 245.
19. John P. Holahan, Emerging Issues in Debt Collection Law, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 267, 267 (2008).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006).
23. Id. § 1692a(6)(A).
24. See infra Part II.B. 1.

25. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also FED R. Civ. P. 38(a); 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2301 (3d ed. 2008).

26. See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607-12 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1505 (2010).
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Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the debt collection
industry in the United States and the background, language, and
consequences of violating the FDCPA. It also discusses the policies
involved in determining whether there is a question of law or fact and the
practical implications of this decision. Part I also examines the standard of
review used to evaluate whether a collection letter contains deceptive or
misleading language. Part II explores the circuit split regarding the
appropriate procedure an FDCPA claim must follow when alleging false,
misleading, or deceptive language in the collection letter. It also looks at
the Fifth Circuit's recent unexplained reversal on this issue. Part III argues
that courts should assess whether the language contained in a collection
letter is misleading to a consumer as a question of law because of the need
to achieve a uniform application of a federal statute, both throughout the
country and within the federal circuits themselves. Part III also argues that
the extrinsic evidence requirement adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is counter to the original intention of the FDCPA and
should be abolished.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
(FDCPA) AND ITS APPLICATION

The Introduction detailed a split among the federal circuit courts as to the
means of determining whether the language of a collection letter is
misleading under the FDCPA: Should it be disposed of as a matter of law
by the judge, submitted with extrinsic evidence to the jury, or sent to a jury
in close cases (without a requirement of extrinsic evidence)? Part I presents
the background necessary to understand this conflict. Part I.A explores the
legislative intent behind the FDCPA and the statutory language relevant to
this conflict, and discusses an important amendment to the FDCPA that
requires attorneys to comply with the Act. Part I.B lays out the difficulty
courts face when classifying an issue as a question of law or fact and the
policy factors that are used to make the appropriate decision. Finally, Part
I.C outlines the standard of review that the decision maker employs to
determine whether a collection letter (or any communication) from a debt
collector violates §§ 1692e or g of the FDCPA.
A. Backgroundof the FDCPA
1. Purpose of Legislation
Congress enacted the FDCPA 27 in 1977 after learning of "abundant
evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection
practices by many debt collectors." 28 Unlike creditors, who had an
27. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).
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incentive to protect their goodwill with customers because of the possibility
of future business, independent debt collectors were unconcerned about a
debtor's opinion and operated by any means necessary. 29 Consumers were
confronted with conduct ranging from "obscene or profane language,
threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation
of a consumer's legal rights, disclosing a consumer's personal affairs to
friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtaining information about a consumer
through false pretense, impersonating public officials and attorneys, and
simulating legal process." 30 One former collection agency employee
testified,
If a debtor asked if he would be imprisoned, the collector would reply
either that he did not know or that the debtor should let his imagination
run wild. It was not unusual to hear a collector inform the debtor that
unless the bill was paid, they would be unable to receive medical services
at any hospital, or that they had better nail their possessions
to the floor
31
before the law came and removed everything they owned.
Another witness testified that in order to collect debts, some collection
agencies' efforts "range[d] from profanity and obscenity in phone calls to
efforts to shame a consumer by contacting relatives, employers, neighbors
to falsely threatening to seek harsh legal sanctions." 32 An additional
witness reported the abuse suffered by one of her clients whose husband
had recently passed away. 33 He left her with a pile of bills, and she only
had her social security income available to pay them. 34 She received a call
from a collection company, threatening to obtain "a court order to dig up
[her husband's] body and repossess the casket" if she did not pay his bills
promptly. 35 She was so disturbed by these threats that she needed medical
36
treatment afterwards.
Prior to the FDCPA, debtors subjected to abusive practices were limited
to tort claims as their only means of recourse. 37 Such claims included libel
and slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy,

29. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
30. Id.
31. FairDebt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on S.656, S.918, S.1130, and H.R.
5294 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 38 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Patricia A. Miller,

former collection agency employee).
32. Id. at 85 (statement of Robert J. Hobbs, Staff Attorney, National Consumer Law
Center).
33. Id. at 58-59 (statement of Karen Berger, Queens Legal Services Corp., New York
City).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Scott J. Burnham, What Attorneys Should Know About the Fair Debt Collection
PracticesAct, or, the 2 Do's and 200 Don 'ts of Debt Collection, 59 MoNT. L. REv. 179, 181

(1998).
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and abuse of process. 3 8 These claims were difficult to establish, and
because each side was required to pay for its own attorney's fees, even
plaintiffs who won their cases had little to show for it. 39 In one particularly
egregious example, Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, the debt collectors for
Public Finance called Davis's home daily, visited her home weekly, called
her at the hospital while she was visiting her sick daughter, and phoned her
friend to inform her that Davis was writing bad checks. 40 On one "house
call," a debt collector asked Davis if he could use her phone to call a
colleague. 4 1 The debt collector used this phone call to give his colleague a
list of Davis's household possessions-so that his company could repossess
them in order to pay off her debt-and refused to leave the house until
Davis's son intervened. 42 Despite these facts, the court concluded that the
debt collector's actions did not satisfy the requirements for intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress and affirmed a dismissal of the
43
case.
Additionally, the Senate found that the vast majority of debtors were
unable to pay their debts for financial reasons, not willfully refusing to
pay. 44 Most debtors who defaulted did so because of circumstances such as
unemployment, severe illness, or divorce. 45 Compounding the problem was
the fact that twenty-four states had weak, if any, debt collection laws. 4 6
The intent of the Act was to abolish these abusive practices while also
ensuring that debt collectors who did not engage in these tactics were not
47
disadvantaged.
2. Relevant Statutory Language
This subsection describes FDCPA §§ 1692e and g in detail and provides
essential background information. The Act only covers consumer debt 4 8
and applies to all communications sent to a debtor.4 9
These
communications include the common collection letter, or "dunning letter,"
(which contains "insistent or repeated demands for payment") as well as

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 360 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. 1976).

41. Id.
42. See id.; Burnham, supra note 37, at 182.
43. Davis, 360 N.E.2d at 768-69; Burnham, supra note 37, at 182.
44. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.

45. Id.
46. Id. at 2, reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696-97.

47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006).
48. See id. § 1692a(5). The FDCPA only applies to debts that "are primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes." Id.
49. Id. § 1692g(a).
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the term "debt collector" does not include
settlement offers. 50 5Importantly,
1
creditor.
original
the
The definition of "debt collector" is fairly broad and is broken up into
two parts. 52 The first part includes anyone "who uses any instrumentality
of interstate commerce" in a business whose main objective is to collect
debts.5 3 The second part applies to "any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to
collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or
due another." 54 Since the purpose of the FDCPA is to protect consumers,
construe "regularly" broadly in order to maximize the scope of
courts may
55
the Act.
Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using "any false, deceptive,
or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of
any debt."'56 It contains a nonexclusive list of sixteen categories of
misleading representations. 5 7 Examples include prohibitions of the "false
representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any
communication is from an attorney," 58 "the threat to take any action that
cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken," 59 and "the use
of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to
collect any debt."' 60 Generally, violation occurs where a collection letter is
susceptible to "more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of
Section 1692e is also violated if the least
which is inaccurate." 61
50. See Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir.
2008). The court in Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. noted that
many courts imprecisely use the terms "dunning letters" and "settlement offers" (which offer
the debtor a chance to settle for a lower amount but do not insist on payment)
interchangeably. Id. at 300 n.4 (citing Gully v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 766,
768 (N.D. Ill. 2005)).
51. Id. § 1692a(6)(A); S. REP. No. 95-382, at 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1697-98; Elizabeth M. Bohn & Ari H. Gerstin, Consumer Debt Collection: FDCPA Traps
for the Unwary NationwideLender, Loan Servicer and Debt Collector: Part I, Am. BANKR.
INST. J., Apr. 2005, at 36. A creditor is defined as any person who "offers or extends credit
creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4); Bohn & Gerstin, supra
note 51, at 36. However, creditors that attempt to collect their debts under other names are
considered debt collectors and are subject to the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Bohn &
Gerstin, supra note 51, at 36. Entities that purchase debts with the sole purpose of collecting
are not considered creditors and are also covered by the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4);
Bohn & Gerstin, supra note 5 1, at 36.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Burnham, supra note 37, at 185-86.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Burnham, supra note 37, at 185-86.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Burnham, supra note 37, at 186.
55. Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Brown v. Card
Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006)); Burnham, supra note 37, at 186.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 1692e(3).
59. Id. § 1692e(5).
60. Id. § 1692e(10).
61. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Dutton v. Wolhar,
809 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Del. 1992)); see also Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
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sophisticated debtor 62 would "'likely be misled' from a communication by
63
a debt collector.
Section 1692g provides that the initial collection letter must contain a
"validation notice" that informs debtors of the actions they must take in
order to assert and preserve their rights. 64 This section is a frequent source
of litigation under the FDCPA and one commentator estimates that ninety
percent of all FDCPA claims involve § 1692g. 6 5 The initial letter (or a
follow-up communication sent within five days) must include information
such as (1) the total amount owed, 66 (2) the creditor to whom the debt is
owed, 67 (3) a notice giving the debtor thirty days to dispute the validity of
the debt, 6 8 and (4) a statement notifying the debtor that if the debtor sends a
written dispute of the debt within thirty days, the debt collector will obtain
verification of the debt and will send it to the debtor. 69
Additionally, under § 1692e(1 1), the debt collector must inform the
debtor that "(1) each communication is for the purpose of collecting a debt,
and (2) 'any information obtained will be used for that purpose.' ' 70 This is
known as a "Miranda Warning,"'7 1 a corollary to the Miranda warnings that
are given to criminal suspects. 72 Just as arrested criminal suspects must be
informed of their legal rights, the Miranda warning required by § 1692e(1 1)
informs the debtor of who she is talking to and the effect of the debtor's
conversation. 73 Further, in all subsequent communications, the collector

Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008) (using an identical test to analyze a § 1692e claim);
Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 441-42 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding that the "more than one reasonable interpretation" test is applicable to the
entirety of § 1692e as a "useful tool" to analyze the least sophisticated consumer test). Note
that the Seventh Circuit does not employ this test because generally a plaintiff must submit
extrinsic evidence in order to reach the jury. See infra Part II.C.
62. This is the hypothetical recipient of collection letters, and is discussed infra in Part
I.C.1.
63. Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989)).
64. See Derek S. Burrell, The FederalFairDebt Collection PracticesAct: An Overview
Rxfor Debt Collector Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 25 (1996); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692g;
Sims v. GC Servs. L.P., 445 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 2006).
65. See Jerry D. Brown, Paintinga Mustache on the Mona Lisa-How Tinkering with
the Validation Notice Will Get You Every Time, 53 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 42, 42 (1999)

(estimating that ninety percent of all FDCPA claims involve § 1692g); Laurie A. Lucas &
Alvin C. Harrell, 2000 Update on the Federal FairDebt Collection Practices Act, 55 Bus.
LAW. 1453, 1454 (2000) (noting that § 1692g is one of the most litigated sections of the
FDCPA).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1).
67. Id. § 1692g(a)(2).
68. Id. § 1692g(a)(3).
69. Id. § 1692g(a)(4).
70. Burrell, supra note 64, at 24; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(l 1); Holahan, supra note
19, at 268.
71. Holahan, supra note 19, at 268.
72. Burnham, supra note 37, at 189.
73. Id.
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must clearly state that the communication
is from a debt collector, known as
74
a "mini-Miranda warning."
It is important to note that mere "technical compliance" with this statute
is not enough. 75 The validation notice must be conveyed effectively to the
debtor and not "overshadowed or contradicted by other messages or notices
appearing in the initial communication from the collection agency." 7 6 A
collection letter must convey this information "clearly and effectively" so
'77
that the least sophisticated debtor will not be "uncertain as to her rights.
A letter that contains typefaces or font sizes that obscure the validation
notice is at risk of78violating § 1692g, despite a verbatim reproduction of the
validation notice.
If the debtor disputes the debt in writing within thirty days, the debt
collector must stop all collection efforts until verification is obtained and
sent to the debtor. 79 However, verification simply involves the debt
collector confirming in writing that the debtor owes the demanded debt to
the stated creditor. 80 As stated in the legislative history, verification is
merely intended to ensure that the letter was delivered to the right person
and that the debt is still delinquent. 8 1 It does not require the82debt collector
to provide the debtor with bills or other evidence of the debt.
The Act imposes strict liability for any violation. 83 Therefore a debtor
can collect statutory damages if a violation exists even if he suffered no
actual damages 84 and was not actually deceived by the letter. 85 In fact,
statutory damages can be awarded even if the debtor does not actually read
the letter. 86 Violations include actions or language by debt collectors
74. Holahan, supra note 19, at 268; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1 1).
75. See Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 484 (quoting Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
77, Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998); see also DeSantis
v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 2001).
78. See Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225 (stating that a required debt validation notice must be
"large enough to be easily read and sufficiently prominent to be noticed-even by the least
sophisticated debtor").
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b); Eric M. Berman, Why Changes Must Be Made to the
Standard of Review Used To Determine Meaningful Attorney Involvement Under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 1, 22-23 (2003); Bohn &
Gerstin, supra note 51, at 49.
80. Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir. 1999); Berman, supra note 79,

at 23.
81. Chaudhry, 174 F.3d at 406; S.REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699; Berman, supra note 79, at 23.
82. Chaudhry, 174 F.3d at 406; Berman, supra note 79, at 23.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).
84. Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed.
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(a).
85. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997); Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677
F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982).

86. See Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 499.
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considered to be "false, deceptive, or misleading"; 87 "harassment or
abuse"; 88 or an "unfair practice." 89 This means that the intention of the
debt collector is irrelevant for purposes of determining liability under the
Act-any conduct that runs afoul of the FDCPA's requirements is sufficient
to establish a successful case against a debt collector. 90 However, once a
violation is established, the debt collector's intent and history of
noncompliance can be considered when determining the extent of
damages. 9 1 The only allowed exception to liability occurs in the case of
"bona fide error." 92 A clerical error, such as sending a debt collection letter
93
to the wrong recipient, is an example of a bona fide error.
Maximum damages are any actual damages 94 (which usually are not
'96
substantial), 95 up to $1000 in statutory damages for "additional damages,
9
7
reasonable attorney's fees, and the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of
the debt collector's net worth for a class action lawsuit. 98 The subsection
providing for reasonable attorney's fees serves as an incentive for attorneys
to initially take an FDCPA case. 99 The purpose for this provision was to
encourage attorneys to take ordinarily undesirable cases (due to the modest
nature of the monetary penalties), thereby benefiting the public. 100

87. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 233. Section 1692e contains a
nonexhaustive list of sixteen prohibited false or misleading misrepresentations. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e(l)-(16). For example, false implication that the debt collector is affiliated with the
U.S. government, or any state governmental entity, is forbidden. Id § 1692e(1).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d; Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 233. Section 1692d contains
a nonexhaustive list of six actions constituting harassment or abuse. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(1)-(6).
For example, a threat or use of violence or other criminal activity to harm the debtor, his
reputation, or property is forbidden. Id. § 1692d(1).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 233. Section 1692f contains a
nonexhaustive list of eight unfair practices. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l)-(8). For instance, the
collection of any amount of money that was not specifically authorized by the contract that
created the debt, or otherwise permitted by law, is forbidden. Id. § 1692f(1).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a); Ruth v. Triumph P'ships, 577 F.3d 790, 805-06 (7th Cir.
2009); Bohn & Gerstin, supra note 51, at 47; see also Sims v. GC Servs., L.P., 445 F.3d 959,
964 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that "intent plays no role in determining whether a particular
letter violates the FDCPA").
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1)-(2); Burnham, supra note 37, at 201-04.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Though the bona fide error defense is beyond the scope of
this Note, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a mistake of law is outside of the bona
fide error defense. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, No. 08-1200,
2010 WL 1558977, at *4 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2010).
93. See generally Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a collection letter constituted a bona fide error when it was mistakenly mailed to the
wrong recipient due to a clerical error, despite a series of procedures designed to avoid such
a scenario).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1).
95. Burnham, supra note 37, at 201.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).
97. Id. § 1692k(a)(3).
98. Id. § 1692k(a)(B).
99. Zagorski v. Midwest Billing Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
100. Burnham, supra note 37, at 201.
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Notably, the Act also allows for debt collectors to recover reasonable
attorney's fees and costs for lawsuits brought in bad faith against them.' 0 '
3. Amendment of the FDCPA To Include Attorneys
The original version of the FDCPA, passed in 1977,102 specifically
exempted attorneys from the definition of "debt collector." 10 3 However, in
1986, the FDCPA was amended to revoke the exemption and specifically
who collect debts on behalf of clients are subject to
provide that attorneys
04
the FDCPA.1
There were a variety of reasons behind Congress's decision to subject
lawyers to the FDCPA. To start, attorneys were committing many of the
abuses that the FDCPA was designed to prohibit. 10 5 Compounding this
problem was the fact that written abuses were contained on attorney
letterhead and sent by attorneys, a group that is generally seen as more
agencies. 10 6 The amendment was
credible and intimidating than collection
10 7
seen as a way to close this loophole.
After the passage of the FDCPA in 1977, attorneys flooded the debt
collection market in order to take advantage of their exemption from the
Act.' 0 8 At the time of the amendment's passage in 1986, the number of
attorney debt collectors outnumbered the amount of professional debt
collection agencies. 10 9 Indeed, many attorney debt collection firms
championed their exemption from the FDCPA when advertising to
creditors, implying that, since they could use collection tactics that
professional collection agencies were barred from using, attorney
collections were more effective and shielded the creditor from liability

101. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).
102. See Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692-1692p).
103. Id. § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. at 875 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a); Heintz v.
Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995). That exemption specified that a "debt collector" did not
include "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of
a client." Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294 (quoting § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. at 875).
104. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294; see also An Act To Amend the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)). This law replaced 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F), which contained the attorney
exemption. Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768. There was no Senate committee report or
floor discussion.
105. See H.R. REp. No. 99-405, at 4-5 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752,
1754-56.
106. See id. at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1755; see also Avila v. Rubin, 84
F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that consumers are inclined to respond more quickly to
a collection letter coming from an attorney as opposed to a collection agency).
107. H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 5, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1756.
108. Id. at 1-2, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1752; Burnham, supra note 37, at 185.
109. H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1752. There were
approximately 5000 attorneys who performed debt collection work compared to 4500
professional debt collection firms. Id.
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under the FDCPA. 110 Congress, however, intended for all firms involved in
debt collection to follow the same rules. "'
One of the reasons behind the initial attorney exemption was the belief
that state bar associations would adequately enforce attorney violations of
the Act.' 1 2 Instead, bar associations routinely failed to sanction abusive
attorney practices that would have violated the FDCPA, and no meaningful
punishment was doled out, even in situations where bar associations
engaged in disciplinary action against attorneys."l 3 In the legislative
history under the 1986 amendment to the FDCPA, Congress declared that
bar associations "failed to fulfill their obligations" that were behind the
original attorney exemption, the situation showed no signs of changing,
and, because of this, "attorneys cannot complain about being brought under
the Act."' 14
4. Scope and Consequences of Attorney Involvement
While the 1986 amendment to the FDCPA removed the attorney
exemption, in Heintz v. Jenkins,115 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
held that the 1986 amendment extended to attorneys who regularly tried to
collect consumer debts through litigation. 1 6 An example is when an
attorney, representing a debt collector, does not bother communicating with
the debtor and simply files a lawsuit. 117 The Heintz court held that the
FDCPA applies to attorneys who "regularly" perform debt collection
activity. 118
110. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1756; see also Burnham, supra note
37, at 185 (stating that some lawyers attempted to attract customers by "boasting" that they
were not bound by the FDCPA); John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REv.
959, 1006 (2009) (noting that lawyers were using their exemption from the FDCPA to
advertise that they were not bound by its restrictions and to broaden their market share).
I 11. H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 6, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1756.
112. Id. at 6, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1757.
113. Id. An FTC survey found that half of attorney disciplinary agencies never punished
conduct that would have violated the FDCPA; the other half of agencies never imposed more
than a private censure, essentially a slap on the wrist. Id.; see also Leubsdorf, supra note
110, at 1006 (noting that some attorney debt collectors used abusive practices and did not
receive professional discipline).
114. H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 7, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1757.
115. 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
116. Id. at 299; Burnham, supra note 37, at 186; Ronald S. Canter & Manuel H.
Newburger, Common Law Immunity for Litigation Activities Under the FairDebt Collection
PracticesAct, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 29, 30 (2007).
117. See Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18, 19-20 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Heintz, 514
U.S. 291. In Green v. Hocking, the attorney debt collector did not contact the debtor before
filing suit. Id. Under Heintz v. Jenkins, the attorney is subject to the FDCPA. See generally
Heintz, 514 U.S. 291.
118. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 299; Canter & Newburger, supra note 116, at 32. In 2006, the
FDCPA was amended to eliminate the need for attorneys to include a verification notice
under § 1692g in a summons or pleading to collect a debt. Financial Services Regulatory
Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-351, § 802, 120 Stat. 1966, 2006 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1692g(d) (2006)); Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 246 n.205.
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In the aftermath of Heintz, subsequent cases have formulated standards to
judge "regular" debt collection activity by attorneys sufficient to subject
them to FDCPA liability. 119 Generally, courts look at the percentage of the
attorney's (or law firm's) practice consisting of debt collection to determine
120
whether the attorney is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA.
Regular debt collection occurs when the attorney "collects debts as a
12 1
substantial, but not principal, part of his or its general law practice.'
However, if the volume of an attorney's debt collection work is high
enough, courts can subject the attorney to FDCPA liability even if this work
is a tiny fraction of the attorney's total business activity. 122 Because the
purpose of the FDCPA is to protect consumers, courts are more likely to
interpret the phrase "debt collection" broadly, maximizing the scope of the
1 23
FDCPA.
When an attorney gets involved with a debtor's file, the courts have
traditionally required that attorneys have some meaningful involvement
with the debtor's account. In Avila v. Rubin, 124 the Seventh Circuit noted
that when an attorney gets involved with a debtor's account, "the price of
poker has just gone up." 125
[I]f a debt collector (attorney or otherwise) wants to take advantage of the
special connotation of the word "attorney" in the minds of delinquent
consumer debtors to better effect collection of the debt, the debt collector
should at least ensure that an attorney has become professionally involved
in the debtor's file. Any other result would sanction the wholesale
licensing of an attorney's
name for commercial purposes, in derogation of
12 6
professional standards.
The Avila court considered a collection letter sent by an attorney who was
not "professionally involved" in the debtor's file to be a false or misleading
representation under § 1692e(3). 12 7 In its decision, the Avila court
frequently cited Clomon v. Jackson128 (discussed below), one of the leading
129
cases on this issue.

119. 2 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 12:8
(2009-2010 ed. 2009).
120. Heller v. Graf, 488 F. Supp. 2d 686, 692 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see, e.g., Scott v. Jones,
964 F.2d 314, 316-18 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding an attorney to be a debt collector where his
debt collection work accounted for seventy to eighty percent of total revenue).
121. Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1176 (6th Cir. 1999).
122. See Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a law firm that
devoted 0.5% of its practice to debt collection was subject to the FDCPA because it mailed
out 639 collection letters to individuals in a nine-month time frame).
123. See Burnham, supra note 37, at 186.
124. 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996).
125. Id. at 229.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
129. This case is discussed infra at notes 187-207.
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Many cases have cited to Clomon and Avila to establish the general rule
that collection letters signed by an attorney imply that the attorney had
professional involvement with the case. 130 In order for a letter to be "from"
an attorney under § 1692e(3), the lawyer must exhibit "the ultimate
professional judgment concerning the existence of a valid debt."' 13 1 Despite
this treatment, courts have not imposed a minimum standard for attorney
involvement, claiming that the inquiry is too fact specific. 132 Therefore,
whether attorney involvement is meaningful enough to comply with the
133
FDCPA is a question of fact.
B. Deciding Between Judge andJury
Part I.A of this Note discussed the history and statutory language of the
FDCPA and covered the scope and purpose of the 1986 amendment to
subject attorneys to FDCPA liability. Because federal circuits are split on
whether a judge or jury should decide the legality of the language contained
in a collection letter, Part I.B. 1 discusses the process of distinguishing
between a question of law and a question of fact, and the practical
implications of the choice. Part I.B.2 discusses the policy interests that
must be weighed when making this choice.
1. Distinguishing a Question of Law from a Question of Fact
In general, courts have great difficulty in classifying an issue as a
question of law or a question of fact. 134 The Supreme Court has noted, "the
appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions
of law has been, to say the least, elusive," and "the Court has yet to arrive at
'a rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a
legal conclusion. '"l 35 One reason for this is that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) 136-which deals with the division of findings of fact and

130. See United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 1996); Irwin v.
Mascott, 112 F. Supp. 2d 937, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see also Crossley v. Lieberman, 868
F.2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989) ("A debt collection letter on an attorney's letterhead conveys
authority and credibility.").
131. Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2001).
132. Id. at 647; Berman, supra note 79, at 1.
133. See Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, No. C 06-2231 WHA, 2007 WL 549904, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007) (sending a dispute about meaningful attorney involvement under
§ 1692e(3), (10) to the jury); Sonmore v. Checkrite Recovery Servs., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1134 (D. Minn. 2001) ("Whether or not attorney involvement is meaningful so as to
comport with the FDCPA is a question of fact.").
134. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
273, 288 (1982) (noting "the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and
questions of law"); Bryan L. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(A) as an
Ideological Weapon?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1025, 1047-49 (2007); Henry P. Monaghan,
ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 232-38 (1985).
135. Miller, 474 U.S. at 113 (quoting Swint, 456 U.S. at 288).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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conclusions of law13 7-does
not provide any guidance on how to
distinguish a question of law from a question of fact.' 38 This issue has
caused problems in 39many areas of the law, including contracts, torts, and
administrative law. 1
The interpretation of a collection letter's language falls into the category
of law application; therefore, policy concerns dictate which decision maker
should be allowed to decide the case. 140 Law application lies in between a
pure question of law or fact. 14 1 It relates to application of the 142
"legal
It
standard of conduct to the facts established by the evidence."
commonly involves an effort to elaborate the governing legal standard, but
is case specific. 143 When classifying an issue of law application as a
question of law or fact, courts must use policy considerations to ask
whether the judge or jury should hear the issue. 144 In fact, one commentator
has said that debating over whether law application is fact-finding or
lawmaking is meaningless, and analyzing the underlying policy
considerations is the manner in which to advance understanding of this
145
issue.
When interpreting the language of a collection letter, courts apply the
facts of the case to a legal standard of conduct, a typical example of law
application. 146 For example, a collection letter is in violation of § 1692e if
it contains a "false, deceptive, or misleading representation."' 14 7 This is the
137. See 9C WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 25, § 2571.
138. See Swint, 456 U.S. at 288; Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the LawFact Distinction,54 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1867-68 (1966).
139. Monaghan, supra note 134, at 232.
140. See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J., dissenting) (citing
Monaghan, supra note 134, at 237), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010). In Miller v.
Fenton, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that when courts attempt to classify issues of law
application, "the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter
of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to
decide the issue in question." Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
141. Adamson, supra note 134, at 1048; Monaghan, supra note 134, at 234, 236 (citing
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 374-76 (tent. ed. 1958)). A pure question of law, or "law declaration"

produces general, broad propositions that affect all future cases that fall within their terms,
involves purely legal questions, and can be decided on a motion for summary judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56; Monaghan, supra note 134, at 235. By contrast, fact identification is case
specific, is created in response to basic inquiries such as who performed a specific action or
where an event took place, and can be performed by someone without the knowledge of the
applicable law. Monaghan, supra note 134, at 235.
142. Monaghan, supra note 134, at 236.
143. Id.; Weiner, supra note 138, at 1875.
144. Miller, 474 U.S. at 113-15; Monaghan, supra note 134, at 236-37 (citing HART &
SACKS, supra note 141, at 376); Weiner, supra note 138, at 1875; Forrest G. Alogna, Note,
Double Jeopardy, Acquittal Appeals, and the Law-Fact Distinction, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
1131, 1157 (2001).
145. Weiner, supra note 138, at 1876.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006); see also McKenzie v. E.A. Uffman and Assocs., Inc., 119
F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1997).
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applicable legal standard for § 1692e cases. Section 1692g mandates that
the debt collector include a "validation notice," which contains all of the
debtor's legal rights. 14 8 It is violated if the letter contains language that
"'contradicts' or "'overshadows' the validation notice. 149 Language
contradicts or overshadows "if it would make the least sophisticated
consumer uncertain as to her rights."' 150 Courts determine if a specific case
violates the FDCPA by looking at the specific facts of the case, usually the
language of the letter itself. 15 1 Therefore, the process of interpreting the
language of a collection letter involves a blend of facts and legal standards,
and requires an application of law to case-specific facts.
2. Policy Factors That Enable Courts To Classify an Application of Law
There are many policy factors that should be considered when a court
decides to classify a specific application of law to facts as legal or factual.
Examples include the force of federal constitutional provisions preserving
the right to a jury trial in a civil suit,152 the relative competence of the judge
or jury to decide a specific application of law, 153 and the uniformity and
predictability of the result that occurs when a judge applies the law-and
154
the lack thereof when a jury is entrusted with law application.
Considerations of stare decisis-adhering to the prior precedent regarding
the correct law/fact distinction on a particular application of law-are also
155
compelling.
In civil cases, the right to a jury trial is central to the U.S. legal system,
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution and "of ancient
origin."'156 The Seventh Amendment provides that the right to a jury trial
shall be preserved "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars."' 15 7 Federal Rule of Civil
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g; see also supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
149. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Graziano v.
Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d
350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting language that overshadows or contradicts a validation notice
that informs debtors of their rights would mislead the least sophisticated debtor).
150. Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996).
151. See Dupuy v. Weltman, Wienberg & Reis Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (N.D. Cal.
2006). Note that the FDCPA covers all communications, including verbal ones such as
phone calls, but verbal communications are beyond the scope of this Note. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(2).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Weiner, supra note 138, at 1876.
153. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985); Weiner, supra note 138, at 1876;
Alogna, supra note 144, at 1160.
154. Weiner, supra note 138, at 1876.
155. Miller, 474 U.S. at 115; Alogna, supra note 144, at 1159.
156. 9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2301; Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to
Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clich~s
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1077
(2003); Weiner, supranote 138, at 1919.

157. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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Procedure 38 simply states that "the right of trial by jury as declared by the
Seventh Amendment . . .is preserved to the parties."' 58 Thus, there is a
159
general federal policy favoring jury trials.
Despite the historical roots of the right to a jury trial, there is a debate
over the usefulness of the jury in civil cases. 160 Some commentators think
the right to a jury trial should be contracted, limited, or abolished altogether
due to the increased expense, time, and overall burden on the judicial
system created by jury trials.161 In their view, a jury trial in a civil case is a
luxury that can no longer be afforded. 162 Other commentators contend that
jury trials preserve American conceptions about the nature of justice and
result in high quality verdicts. 163 Citizen participation in the 64civil justice
system is both healthy and important for the process of justice.1
In an action under a statute such as the FDCPA, there are two possible
sources for a right to a jury trial: (1) Congress specifically enunciating this
intent in the language of the Act or (2) if the claim concerns remedies and
legal rights historically enforced in an action at law, through the Seventh
Amendment.

16 5

In Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Service,166 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial
in an action for damages under the FDCPA, using two arguments to support
its reasoning. 167 The first concerned § 1692k(a)-(b), which provides that
"the court" can determine the amount of damages.1 68 The court interpreted
the word "court" to encompass both judge and jury. 169 Second, the court
noted that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial upon request if the
statute produces legal claims and remedies that can be enforced for
158. FED R. Civ. P. 38(a).
159. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) ("The federal policy favoring jury
trials is of historic and continuing strength."); Weiner, supra note 138, at 1919. Notably, the
Seventh Amendment has not been made binding on the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment, so there is no constitutional right to a civil jury trial in state court. Chicago, R.I.
& P.R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54,56 (1919); 9CWRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 25, § 2301.
160. 9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2301.
161. Id.; Fleming James, Jr., Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure,45
YALE L.J. 1022, 1026 (1936) (noting that jury trials are "expensive and dilatory-perhaps
anachronistic" and that the number of jury trials should be reduced); David W. Peck, Do
Juries Delay Justice?, 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956) (arguing that the right to a jury trial should be
eliminated in civil cases).
162. 9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2301.

163. See id.; Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The ConstitutionalRight to a Jury of
Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1993) (arguing that the civil jury is an
essential element of the U.S. legal system).
164. 9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2301; Arnold, supra note 163, at 31-32.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830,
832 (11 th Cir. 1982); Storer Cable Commc'ns v. Joe's Place Bar & Rest., 819 F. Supp. 593,
595 (W.D. Ky. 1993); 9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2302.

166.
167.
168.
169.

677 F.2d 830.
See idat 832-34.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)-(b) (2006); Sibley, 677 F.2d at 832-33.
Sibley, 677 F.2d at 832-33.
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damages in the courts of law. 170 Because the FDCPA allows for monetary
damages-and was similar to a traditional tort because of its intent to
prevent harassment, abuse, or false and misleading practices-the court
allowed a jury trial on the issue of damages. 171 Sibley's reasoning has been
adopted by the Seventh Circuit, 172 but rejected by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 173 Thus, the circuit split on the issue of
who should decide whether the language in a collection letter is misleading
extends to the issue of determining statutory damages as well.
There are also major precedential differences between allowing a judge
or jury to perform the task of law application. 174 If the issue is tasked to the
jury, the decision will have no precedential value. 175 In contrast, if the
judge performs law application, his decisions will have precedential value
on all future cases involving similar facts. 176 If a set of facts is likely to
reoccur, law application by a jury will lead to inconsistent results in
successive cases. 177 Indeed, a jury will not be allowed to learn what
previous juries have concluded on the same facts. 178 Legal consistency is a
goal "worthy of serious attention" as two different results for identical facts
violate our basic notions of fairness. 179 However, some inconsistency is
tolerated in the law, notably in negligence cases. 180 This inconsistency is
explained by judicial deference towards the jury. 181
C. Legal Standardfor Deceptive or Misleading Language
This part describes the standard of review courts use to determine
whether a collection letter contains misleading language in violation of
§§ 1692e and g. Part I.C.1 introduces the least sophisticated consumer (or
debtor) standard. Part I.C.2 discusses the unsophisticated consumer
standard, currently applied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits. Part I.C.3 discusses the practices of the Fifth Circuit,
which has declined to choose between the two options, asserting that there
is little practical difference between them.

170. Id. at 833-34 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974)).
171. Id. at 834.
172. See generally Kobs v. Arrow Serv. Bureau, Inc., 134 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a jury may determine the statutory damages provision of the FDCPA).
173. Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The decision
whether to award statutory damages under the FDCPA and the size of the award are matters
committed to the sound discretion of the district court." (citing Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d
1314, 1322 (2d Cir. 1993))).
174. See Weiner, supra note 138, at 1875 & n.37.
175. Id. at 1875 n.37, 1924.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1924.
178. Id.

179. Id.
180. Id. at 1924-25.
181. Id. at 1925.
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1. Least Sophisticated Consumer-Clomon v. Jackson
To ensure a letter passes muster under the FDCPA, most circuits evaluate
the language of a collection letter under the "least sophisticated consumer
standard."' 182 This test is primarily used to determine whether a letter
violates § 1692e, which forbids a letter from using any "false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt."' 183 It is an objective test designed to "protect 'all consumers, the
gullible as well as the shrewd."" '184 It relies on assumptions about the
debtor of below-average intelligence, as this person is especially vulnerable
to fraudulent schemes. 185 Despite the lowly implication of the term "least
sophisticated consumer," the test presumes a basic level of competence
among debtors and incorporates a certain degree of reasonableness by
protecting debt collectors from liability for unreasonable interpretations of
86
collection letters. 1
Clomon v. Jackson, a Second Circuit case, illustrates the least
sophisticated consumer standard. In Clomon, the appellant, Phillip Jackson,
worked part-time as general counsel for a debt collection agency, NCB
Collection Services (NCB), that collected debts on behalf of American
Family Publishers (AFP). 187
NCB sent out collection letters to
approximately one million debtors per year through a mass mailing
system. 188 Through this system, AFP provided NCB with computer tapes
that contained the name, address, account number, and delinquent balance
of all debtors who were behind in their account payments. 189 NCB then
transferred this information into its own computer system, which not only
inserted the data into a form letter, but also printed, folded, and placed each
182. See Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 550 F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir.
2008); Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 438-39 (6th
Cir. 2008); Greco v. Trauner, 412 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Clomon v. Jackson,
988 F.2d 1314, 1318-19 (2d Cir. 1993)); United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d
131, 136 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the least sophisticated consumer standard is in line with
basic consumer protection principles); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175
(11 th Cir. 1985); Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982). The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the First and Tenth Circuits have not ruled on the issue, although
district courts in these circuits apply the least sophisticated consumer standard. See Billsie v.
Brooksbank, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (D.N.M. 2007) (noting that courts use the least
sophisticated consumer standard); Martin v. Sands, 62 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199-200 (D. Mass.
1999) (applying the least sophisticated debtor standard); Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at
234 & n.3 4 .
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006); Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318; see also supra notes 56-60,
87 and accompanying text.
184. Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Clomon, 988
F.2d at 1318).
185. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319.
186. See id. (noting that even the least sophisticated consumer is assumed to have "a
willingness to read a collection notice with some care").
187. Id. at 1316.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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letter into an envelope. 190 If a debtor did not respond to this letter, NCB
mailed out additional letters on a preset schedule. 19 1 No employee of NCB
reviewed any debtor's account unless the debtor responded to the collection
92
letter.'
The Appellee, Christ Clomon, received six form letters from NCB
concerning a $9.42 debt owed to AFP. 193 The first letter was on NCB's
letterhead, and signed by "Althea Thomas, Account Supervisor," but the
remaining five letters were on Jackson's attorney letterhead and signed
(through a machine) by "P.D. JACKSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
GENERAL COUNSEL, NCB COLLECTION SERVICES."' 194 The letters
stated, among other threats, that Jackson authorized NCB to undertake legal
action to collect Clomon's debt and that "we" will take appropriate action
under the law to collect Clomon's "seriously past due account."' 195 While
approving the initial form letter and procedures by which it was sent,
Jackson conceded that he had no personal involvement in Clomon's (or
96
anyone else's) account.1
On September 23, 1991, Clomon filed a complaint and alleged that
Jackson violated the FDCPA by authorizing NCB to mail the collection
letters that she received. 197 The district court granted summary judgment
for Clomon-holding that Jackson violated § 1692e(3)1 98-and awarded
her the maximum statutory damages of $1000.199
In determining whether a collection letter violated § 1692e, the court
announced that the most widely used test was the "least sophisticated
consumer" standard-and adopted its use in the Second Circuit.200 The
court noted that the intent of this test (to protect all members of the public,
not just the shrewd) was consistent with traditional principles of consumer
protection law. 20 1 Despite the assertion that the least sophisticated
190. Id.
191. Id.

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1316-17. The letters were sent over a four month period, from March 1991 to
June 1991. Id. at 1317.
195. Id. at 1317.
196. Id. Specifically, Jackson did not review Clomon's file or letters that were sent to her,
provide any advice to AFP about the circumstances surrounding Clomon's case, nor did he
receive any instructions from AFP about how to proceed against Clomon. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1320. This subsection prohibits "[t]he false representation or implication that
any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e(3) (2006).
199. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1317.
200. Id. at 1318.
201. Id.at 1318-19. In particular, consumer protection cases held that the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), which established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), was
made for the protection of the public, including the ignorant and unthinking. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58; Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318-19 (quoting Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944)). Later cases held that when "evaluating
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consumer test is designed to protect all members of the public, Clomon
emphasized that courts have applied the least sophisticated consumer test
while utilizing the concept of reasonableness. 20 2 Specifically, courts
applying the test have routinely protected debt collectors from unreasonable
interpretations of collection letters. 20 3 The court stated that the existence of
a substantial body of case law established the two purposes of the least
sophisticated consumer test:
"it (1) ensure[d] the protection of all
consumers, even the naive and the trusting, against deceptive debt
collection practices, and (2) protect[ed] debt collectors against
liability for
20 4
bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices."
The court held that Jackson's use of attorney letterhead and his signature
constituted a false and misleading impression under § 1692e(3) that an
attorney had sent out the collection letters, given that he had virtually no
"day-to-day" involvement in the debt collection process. 20 5 The court also
found that the language and threats contained in the letters would cause the
least sophisticated consumer to believe that Jackson had conducted a review
of individual debtors' files and had decided the best approach to collect on
their debts. 20 6 The court affirmed the district court's ruling, and noted that
20 7
the facts also established a violation of § 1692e(10).
2. Unsophisticated Consumer-Gammon v. GC Services Limited
Partnership
Both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits apply the unsophisticated consumer
standard to evaluate whether the language in a debt collection letter is
misleading under § 1692e of the FDCPA. 20 8 This test retains nearly the

the tendency of language to deceive, the [FTC] should look not to the most sophisticated
readers but rather to the least." Id. at 1318-19 (quoting Exposition Press, Inc. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961)). Essentially, courts have adopted the least
sophisticated consumer standard because they have integrated the principles of the FTC Act
into their interpretations of the FDCPA. See id. at 1319.
202. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319.
203. Id.; see also Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 1996)); Lucas & Harrell, supra
note 16, at 235 & n.50.
204. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320. The second purpose is particularly important because
Congress intended to "insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt
collection practices arc not competitively disadvantaged." Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland
Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)); see also
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
205. See 15 U.S.C. 1692e(3); Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320.
206. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1317, 1320.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits "[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive
means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a
consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).
208. Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874-75 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[The unsophisticated
consumer standard] protects the uninformed or naive consumer, yet also contains an
objective element of reasonableness to protect debt collectors from liability for peculiar
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same substance of the least sophisticated consumer standard as it has been
utilized by the courts, but uses an arguably less confusing moniker. 20 9 Like
the least sophisticated consumer test, statements that are "merely
'susceptible of an ingenious misreading' do not violate the FDCPA. ' '2 10
The unsophisticated consumer test is slightly more stringent than the least
sophisticated consumer standard. 2 11 While the least sophisticated consumer
may have a rudimentary understanding of the world, the unsophisticated
consumer is "not quite as ignorant or gullible as the least sophisticated
consumer" and knows how to make inferences. 2 12 Despite these minor
theoretical deviations, the practical differences between the tests are not
2 13
substantial.
The unsophisticated consumer standard was first introduced in Gammon
v. GC Services Limited Partnership.2 14 In Gammon, the appellant, Jeffrey
Gammon, was mailed a debt collection letter from the appellee, GC
Services Limited Partnership, stemming from a debt owed to American
Express. 2 15 The language at issue in the letter stated, "We provided the
systems used by a major branch of the federal government and various state
governments to collect delinquent taxes. . . . You must surely know the
problems you will face later if you do not pay."'2 16 Gammon filed a
complaint with the district court, alleging a violation of FDCPA § 1692e,
specifically § 1692e(l). 2 17 He contended that the language about working
for the federal and various state governments implied that GC Services was
"vouched for or is affiliated with or is acting on behalf of both federal and
state government in connection with collection of this debt."'2 18 The district
court moved sua sponte to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction claiming that it was "an impermissible strain on the English

interpretations of collections letters."); Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254,
1257 (7th Cir. 1994).
209. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1996); Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257.
210. Peters v. Gen. Servs. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting
White v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000)) (noting that a "description of rights
belonging to Colorado residents does not misleadingly imply that residents of other states
have no such rights").
211. 2 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 119, § 12:21.
212. Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 240.
213. Avila, 84 F.3d at 227; 2 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 119, § 12:21; Elwin
Griffith, The Search for More Fairness in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 12 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAc. 151, 157 n.26 (2003). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

finds no meaningful difference between the two terms and uses them interchangeably. See
infra Part I.C.3.
214. 27 F.3d 1254; Lucas & Harrell,supra note 16, at 236.
215. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1255.
216. Id.

217. Id at 1256. Subsection 1 prohibits "[t]he false representation or implication that the
debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any
State ..." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1) (2006).
218. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1256.
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implied that it
language" for Gammon to claim that GC's truthful2 statement
19
was affiliated with the federal or state government.
In making a determination about whether this letter violated § 1692e(l)
of the FDCPA, the court articulated the "unsophisticated consumer"
standard. 220 While the court agreed with the policy behind the least
sophisticated consumer test-to protect the general public, including the
gullible and the ignorant-the court felt that if taken literally, the least
sophisticated consumer test would be far too expansive. 22 1 While courts
that use the least sophisticated consumer standard also incorporate the
element of reasonableness, 222 the Gammon court decided that the
"unsophisticated consumer" standard lends a more accurate phrasing. 223 It
believed that an unsophisticated consumer test would eliminate the
contradiction between what the least sophisticated consumer standard
would involve if taken literally and the way it had been interpreted by the
courts. 224 Like the least sophisticated consumer test, the unsophisticated
consumer standard protects the uninformed consumer while shielding debt
collectors from "unrealistic or peculiar interpretations of collection
225
letters."
In its analysis, the court determined that an unsophisticated consumer
could reasonably be misled by the language of GC Services' collection
letter. 226 The Gammon court concluded that the disputed language could
give an unsophisticated consumer the impression that GC Services worked
closely with the federal and state governments and could use their systems
of the
to collect the delinquent debt. 227 The court vacated the judgment
22 8
district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

219. Id.
220. Id. at 1257.

221. Id. The court concluded that it was "virtually impossible" to analyze a case using a
least sophisticated consumer standard because the phrase "least sophisticated" presumes that
the debtor was "the very last rung on the sophistication ladder" or "the single most
unsophisticated consumer who exists." Id.
222. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
223. Gammon, 27 F.3dat 1257.

224. Id.
225. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook clarified that the Seventh
Circuit's unsophisticated consumer test requires a plaintiff to establish that a "significant
fraction" of the intended recipients were deceived by the collection letter. Id. at 1260
(Easterbrook, J., concurring); see also Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211
F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000). Judge Easterbrook's concurring opinion in Gammon v. GC
Services Limited Partnershipwas the first time that the Seventh Circuit discussed a possible

requirement of extrinsic evidence in order for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment in the
FDCPA context. Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 237-38. His majority opinion in
Johnson v. Revenue Management Corp., five years later, laid the "precedential foundation"

for the extrinsic evidence requirement. 169 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucas &
Harrell, supra note 16, at 237-38. This requirement is discussed infra in Part II.C.
226. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257.
227. Id. at 1257-58.

228. Id. at 1258.
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3. Fifth Circuit-Unsophisticated or Least Sophisticated Consumer
The Fifth Circuit considers the least sophisticated consumer standard and
the unsophisticated consumer standard to be substantively the same. 2 29 It
uses the two terms interchangeably 230 and has explicitly declined to choose
between the two. 23 1 Consistent with both standards, the Fifth Circuit
assumes the debtor is "neither shrewd nor experienced in dealing with
creditors," 232 but also protects the debt collector from "bizarre or
idiosyncratic consumer interpretations of collection materials." 233 This
appears to affirm the belief that there is little practical difference between
234
the two standards.
II.

EXPLORING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT-WHO SHOULD INTERPRET THE

LANGUAGE OF A COLLECTION LETTER: JUDGE OR JURY?

Part I.C provided an overview of the least sophisticated debtor and
unsophisticated debtor standards used when assessing whether an FDCPA
violation has occurred. This part examines a substantial conflict regarding
the appropriate party to decide if the language in a collection letter is
misleading or confusing: judge or jury. It focuses on two sections under
which this issue frequently arises. The first, § 1692g, requires a debt
collector to include a validation notice in the initial communication that
informs a debtor of her statutory rights. The second, § 1692e, prohibits a
debt collector from making false, misleading, or deceptive representations
in the course of debt collection.
Part II.A discusses the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits' approach
to § 1692g claims, and also discusses the the way that district courts in
other circuits approach § 1692g claims.
These circuits treat this
determination as a question of law. Part II.B. 1 discusses the Second and
Ninth Circuits' approach to § 1692e claims. When the collection letter
speaks for itself, these circuits treat the interpretation of its language as a
question of law and allow the judge to decide if the collection letter would
confuse or mislead the least sophisticated debtor. Part II.B.2 discusses the
229. Youngblood v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 186 F. Supp. 2d 695, 697 (W.D. Tex. 2002);
Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 234-35, 246 n.206.
230. Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., 377 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We must

evaluate any potential deception in the letter under an unsophisticated or least sophisticated
consumer standard." (citing Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232,
1236 (5th Cir. 1997))).
231. Peter v. GC Servs., L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 348 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Because the

difference between the standards is de minimis at most, we again opt not to choose between
these standards."); Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Law, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 655, 665
n. 115 (2004) (noting that "[t]he Fifth Circuit has explicitly avoided ruling on which of these
standards, if either, to use").
232. Goswami, 377 F.3d at 495.
233. Taylor, 103 F.3d at 1236 (citing Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318-19 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
234. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits' approach to the same issue. These
courts have allowed a jury to determine liability, thus treating this issue as a
question of fact. In doing so, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have
introduced inconsistency to their application of §§ 1692e and g of the
FDCPA. Part II.C provides a comprehensive overview of the Seventh
Circuit's unique take on the issue of whether a collection letter violates the
FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit treats both § 1692e and § 1692g claims as
issues of fact, and requires a showing of actual debtor confusion to defeat a
debt collector's motion for summary judgment. This is accomplished
through the production of extrinsic evidence (frequently in the form of
surveys) and is required in cases where it is not obvious from its face that a
letter contains misleading or deceptive language.
A. Section 1692g Cases-The Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits'
Approach-Question ofLaw
This Note focuses on the conflict among the circuits in their application
of § 1692e. However, some circuits, namely the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits, apply various provisions of the FDCPA somewhat inconsistently.
To elucidate the inconsistency, the following section describes briefly the
general consensus that a § 1692g determination should be treated as a
question of law. Then, Part II.B discusses the circuit split regarding
§ 1692e and, in doing so, reveals the inconsistency in the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits' applications of §§ 1692e and g. Part II.C describes the
Seventh Circuit's approach to both §§ 1692e and g claims. The Seventh
Circuit treats both as questions of fact, aligning itself with the Fifth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits with respect to § 1692e claims and departing from the
general consensus regarding § 1692g claims.
In determining whether the language contained in a debt collection letter
is misleading to the least sophisticated consumer under FDCPA § 1692g,
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
conclude that the issue is a question of law. 235 Additionally, district courts
in the Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that this issue is a
question of law. 236 Despite this treatment, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
235. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the
majority of courts that considered the question of whether language in a collection letter
contradicts or overshadows a required validation notice that informs debtors of their legal
rights has determined that whether the least sophisticated consumer would be misled by a
collection letter is a question of law); Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997);
see also Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 508 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)
(citing Savage v. Hatcher, 109 F. App'x 759, 762 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Seventh Circuit's
approach is discussed infra in Part II.C. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
treats this issue as a question of law. See Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv. Inc., 380
F.3d 316, 318-20 (8th Cir. 2004); Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055 n.4
& 1057 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874-75 (8th Cir. 2000)).
236. See McCormick v. Wells Fargo Bank, 640 F. Supp. 2d 795, 798-99 (S.D. W. Va.
2009); Shimek v. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1349
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the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
handle § 1692e claims involving this same
237
issue as a question of fact.
Terran v. Kaplan23 8 is illustrative of this general consensus. In Terran,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that "the caselaw
makes clear that the question [of] whether language in a collection letter
overshadows or contradicts the validation notice so as to confuse a least
sophisticated debtor is a question of law." 239 Terran's decision to treat this
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit never took
up the issue but concluding it was a question of law). The Second Circuit has also not
explicitly ruled on the issue. Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, P.L.L.C., 655 F. Supp. 2d
200, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Miller v. Wolpoff& Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292 (2d
Cir. 2003)). Although the Second Circuit has never explicitly articulated a position on this
issue, it has treated § 1692g claims that allege an overshadowing or contradiction of the
validation notice as issues of law. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516
F.3d 85, 91-95 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a collection letter would not mislead the least
sophisticated consumer as to his right to dispute the debt before payment under § 1692g(a));
Miller, 321 F.3d at 308-11 (finding that the language in a collection letter would not mislead
or deceive the least sophisticated consumer of his rights under § 1692g). Additionally, many
district court decisions have cited to Second Circuit cases for the proposition that § 1692g
claims are treated as questions of law. Nero, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 205 ("The determination of
whether a validation notice complies with the FDCPA is an issue of law that can be decided
by a court." (citing Miller, 321 F.3d at 3 10-11)); Daneshrad v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP,
No. 05 CV 2662(SJF)(ETB), 2009 WL 637888, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2009) ("'Whether
the particular wording of a letter violates the FDCPA is an issue of law that can be decided
by a court on a motion for summary judgment."' (quoting Harry v. Pentaeroup Fin., LLC,
No. 04 Civ. 4003, 2007 WL 812998, at * 2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2007)) (citing Miller, 321
F.3d at 310-11)); Berger v. Suburban Credit Corp., No. 04 CV 4006 CLP, 2006 WL
2570915, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) ("[T]he Second Circuit has indicated that the
determination of how the least sophisticated consumer would view language in a defendant's
collection letter is a question of law .... (citing Schweizer v. Trans Union Corp., 136 F.3d
233, 237-38 (2d Cir.1998); Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62-63 (2d
Cir. 1993)). But see In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Litig., 208 F.R.D. 493, 501-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (sending a collection letter to the jury to
determine if it would mislead the least sophisticated consumer under § 1692g); Goldberg v.
Winston & Morrone, P.C., No. 95 Civ. 9282 (LAK), 1997 WL 139526, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26 1997) (same). The court in Goldberg v. Winston & Morrone, P.C. also sent a
§ 1692e claim to the jury to determine if the collection letter language was deceptive;
however this case was decided before Schweizer, which clearly held that the question of
deceptiveness was not a factual question for the jury. Schweizer, 136 F.3d at 237-38 ("[T]he
question of deceptiveness is appropriate for summary judgment."); Goldberg, 1997 WL
139526, at *6-7; see also infra notes 248-57 and accompanying text. While never expressly
stating its position on the § 1692g issue, the Fifth Circuit had previously treated §§ 1692e
and g questions as issues of law before abruptly reversing its position with respect to § 1692e
cases in August 2009. See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010); Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344,
348-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the language in a collection letter "fully informed" the
least sophisticated or unsophisticated consumer as to her § 1692g rights and was not
deceptive or misleading); see also infra notes 304, 318 and accompanying text. But see
Youngblood v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 186 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698-700 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(denying the plaintiff s motion for summary judgment in a § 1692g case).
237. See infra Part II.B.2.
238. 109 F.3d 1428.
239. Id. at 1432.
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as a question of law was supported by the rationale behind the de novo
standard of review for contracts and other written instruments, such as
trusts and collective bargaining agreements. 240 The determination of
whether language in a collection letter is deceptive, the court reasoned,
"does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. '24 1 Rather, just as in
contract cases, the language of the collection letters themselves is
undisputed; therefore the court can analyze the language to determine if it
242
comports with the FDCPA.
While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not explicitly
ruled on this issue, a recent district court decision attempted to deduce
which way the Fourth Circuit would come down. In McCormick v. Wells
Fargo Bank,243 the District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, "convinced" that the Fourth Circuit would find the issue of
contradictory language in a collection letter to be a question of law (the
Fourth Circuit never explicitly addressed the issue, only dealing with it
through summary judgments), cited Terran's contract rationale, and
expressly joined the majority. 244 This was because "all of the Fourth
Circuit's section 1692g analysis centered on one thing: the dunning
letter." 245 It concluded that this issue could be dealt with, and disposed of,
246
on a motion to dismiss.
The above reflects the general consensus that § 1692g claims should be
treated as questions of law. This is somewhat in tension with the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits' application of § 1692e. This tension will be revisited in
Part III of the Note.
B. Section 1692e Cases When the Letter Speaks for Itself
While Part II.A explored the general consensus that a judge can decide
whether a collection letter violates § 16 92g as a matter of law (except in the
Seventh Circuit 247), this part explores the circuit split that has arisen about
the appropriate party to decide whether a collection letter violates § 1692e.
1. The Second and Ninth Circuits' Approach-Question of Law
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits treat a collection letter's
interpretation as a question of law in § 1692e cases. In Schweizer v. Trans

240. Id.
241. Id. This is in direct conflict with the Seventh Circuit's requirement of extrinsic
evidence discussed infra at Part II.C. See also Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350,
353 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000).
242. Terran, 109 F.3d at 1431-32.
243. 640 F. Supp. 2d 795 (S.D. W. Va. 2009).
244. Id. at 798-99.
245. Id. at 799.
246. Id.
247. See infra Part I.C.
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Union Corp.,248 a Second Circuit case, the debtor raised a claim under
§ 1692e(10), which prohibits the general use of any "false representation or
deceptive means" when collecting a debt. 249 The debtor had received a
collection letter-for a debt of $15-in an envelope labeled
"ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED BY LASON SYSTEMS, INC.
FOR PRIORITY POSTAL DELIVERY" and "Priority-Gram," despite the
fact that the letter was delivered by mail. 250 She alleged that this simulated
25 1
a telegram and created a false sense of urgency, in violation of § 1692e.
252
The district court entered summary judgment for the debt collector.
On appeal, the FTC submitted an amicus brief arguing that a reasonable
jury could find the envelope deceptive, and urged the court to find that
deceptiveness was an issue of fact for the jury (or judge if a jury trial was
waived) to determine. 253 The brief noted that the FTC itself treats such
2 54
issues as questions of fact, with the Commission as fact finder.
However, the FTC noted an "important divergence" among the courts on
this issue and acknowledged that courts were increasingly deciding for
themselves how the least sophisticated consumer would interpret a
particular debt collection claim. 255 It speculated that this development was
initiated by a growing FDCPA caseload and the need for a speedy
256
resolution of this increasing caseload.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the FTC's argument to send the
question of deceptiveness to a jury, declared that the question of
deceptiveness was appropriate for summary judgment, and affirmed the
district court's order of summary judgment for the defendant. 257 However,
it declined to decide what language--contained on the envelope or in the
letter-would create a false sense of urgency when received by the least
258
sophisticated debtor.
Similarly, in Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 2 59 when analyzing a § 1692e(10)
claim, the Second Circuit noted that the language in a collection letter is
deceptive when it "can be reasonably read to have two or more different
meanings, one of which is inaccurate." 260 The court then found that the
collection letter in question was "reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate
248. 136 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1998).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) (2006); Schweizer, 136 F.3d at 235.
250. Schweizer, 136 F.3d at 236.
251. Id.

252. Id.
253. Id. at 236-37.
254. Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission at 13, Schweizer, 136 F.3d 233
(No. 97-7542).
255. Id. at 14.
256. Id. at 5.
257. Schweizer, 136 F.3d at 238.
258. Id.
259. 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
260. Id. at 35 (citing Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993)). Russell v.

Equifax A.R.S. involved §§ 1692e(10) and g claims. Id. at 33.
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reading" and therefore violated § 1692e(l0). 26 1 The court in Russell also
analyzed a later collection letter, held that the letter was "open to an
inaccurate yet reasonable interpretation" by the least sophisticated debtor,
and, therefore, also violated § 1692e(10). 262 Thus, in the Second Circuit,
the judge steps into the shoes of the least sophisticated consumer and
determines if a letter is "open" to an inaccurate interpretation.
Accordingly, in a later § 1692e case (involving § 1692e(5) and (10)), the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled based on
what the least sophisticated debtor "could" or "may" think. 263 Again, the
court reviewed the text of a collection letter itself, determined if it was
"plausible" that the least sophisticated consumer could interpret the
language in a manner that would violate the FDCPA, and found a violation
of law, without the need for a jury to determine actual
as a matter
264
confusion.
In the Ninth Circuit, as in the Second Circuit, "the caselaw makes clear
that the question whether language in a collection letter ...[would] confuse
a least sophisticated debtor is a question of law." 26 5 In Gonzales v. Arrow
Financial Services LLC 266 (also involving claims under § 1692e(5) and
(10)) the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found a
collection letter to be in violation of § 1692e(1O) based on what the least
sophisticated debtor "could likely believe." 2 67 According to the Gonzales
court, "The court, not the jury, determines whether a collection 2letter
68 It
violates the Act by applying this 'least sophisticated debtor' standard.
went on to state, "This Court has unearthed no case in which the plaintiff
was required to present [extrinsic evidence], to support the Court's finding
269
in plaintiffs favor under the 'least sophisticated debtor' standard.
261. Id.at 35.
262. Id. at 36.
263. Fainbrun v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 246 F.R.D. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding

that a collection letter that "could" mislead the least sophisticated consumer based on what
he "may understand" from the letter, violated § 1692e(5), (10) as a matter of law).
264. Id.
265. Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Swanson v. S. Or.

Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1224-29 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the least
sophisticated consumer standard applies to § 1692e(5) and treating liability in a case
involving § 1692e(5) and § 1692g claims as a question of law); Hapin v. Arrow Fin. Servs.,
428 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that "the issue of whether the language
of a collcction letter violates the FDCPA is a matter of law" (citing Terran, 109 F.3d at
1431-32)); Anderson v. Credit Collection Serv., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 (S.D. Cal.

2004) ("In the 9th Circuit, the court-and not the jury-determines whether a particular
collection letter violates the FDCPA." (citing Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225-26)).

The

collection letter at issue in Swanson presented a very close case and sparked a dissent on the
issue of liability under §§ 1692e and g. See Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1229-30 (Wallace, J.,

dissenting).
266. 489 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

267. Id. at 1153.
268. Id.at 1146 (citations omitted).
269. Id. at 1149.
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Similarly, in Dupuy v. Weltman, Wienberg & Reis Co.,2 70 when interpreting
a collection letter, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California compared the language in the letter to language found as
threatening by other courts in determining whether to grant27 1a motion to
dismiss a § 1692e(5) claim rather than send the case to a jury.
Although the Third Circuit appears to treat the issue of a collection
letter's interpretation as a question of law, its exact position in § 1692e
cases is unclear. 272 Though Wilson v. Quadramed Corp.273 has been cited
for the proposition that whether a collection letter is misleading under the
FDCPA is a question of law in the Third Circuit, 274 Wilson was limited to
§ 1692g claims and did not involve § 1692e claims. 275 The Wilson court
said that the question of "whether language in a collection letter contradicts
or overshadows the validation notice is a question of law," a legal standard
generally limited to § 1692g claims. 2 76 As the inquiries under §§ 1692e and
g are highly related, 27 7 one can presume that the Third Circuit treats
collection letter interpretation cases under § 1692e as matters of law;
278
however it is impossible to be certain of this conclusion.
This potential for confusion is illustrated by Rosenau v. Unifund
Corp.,279 which involved a third-party debt collector who sent out
collection letters signed by a legal department that did not contain any
lawyers. 280 The plaintiff brought an action under § 1692e(3), alleging that
the letter could reasonably be read to have come from an attorney, when in
fact it did not.2 8 1 The Rosenau court treated the issue as whether the least
sophisticated consumer could reasonably read the letter "to have two
different meanings, one of which is inaccurate." 2 82 In reversing the district
court's granting of judgment on the pleadings for the debt collector, the
270. 442 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
271. Id. at 826. Note that a district court in the Ninth Circuit generally treats all other
issues arising under the FDCPA (that do not involve whether the language in a collection
letter is deceptive) as questions of fact. See United States v. ACB Sales & Serv., Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 561, 570 (D. Ariz. 1984).
272. See Brown v. Card Servs. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 452, 455 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that it

could be deceptive under § 1692e(5) for the debt collector to assert that it could take an
action that it has no intention of taking or has rarely taken before).
273. 225 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000).

274. See Martsolf v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., No. 1:04-CV-1346, 2008 WL 275719, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008).
275. Wilson, 225 F.3d at 361.
276. Id. at 353 n.2; see also supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
277. See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 610 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J., dissenting)
("[T]he inquiry is the same: how will an unsophisticated consumer interpret the language of
a debt collection letter."), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1505 (2010).
278. See supra notes 76-78, 87 and accompanying text; infra note 326 and accompanying
text.
279. 539 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008).
280. Id. at 220, 222.
281. Id. at 219-20.
282. Id. at 223 (quoting Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354).
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Rosenau court held that it was possible for such a debtor to "reasonably
infer" that the legal department employed attorneys who played a role in
2 83
sending the letter.
Despite this finding, the Rosenau court did not grant summary judgment
for the plaintiff (as it was not moved for) and the case subsequently
settled. 284 On remand, in an order approving a settlement, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that "the parties agree
'285
that both liability and damages are likely to be questions for the jury.
While the parties could have been wrong about this issue, unless the Third
Circuit directly addresses whether the judge or jury should interpret the
language of collection letters in § 1692e cases, it is difficult to be entirely
positive of its position.
2. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits' Approach-Question of Fact
When the sole issue in a § 1692e claim concerns whether the language in
a collection letter is misleading, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have
treated it as a question of fact and sent it to the jury.
In Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC,28 6 the Sixth
Circuit first encountered a case involving a collection letter from an
attorney on law firm letterhead with no disclaimer. 287 The attorney
involvement was not at issue, as Margelefsky admitted he had no personal
involvement; however the letter was signed by an "Account
Representative," and at oral argument Margelefsky conceded that the letter
was not reviewed by an account representative. 288 In contrast to the Second
and Ninth Circuits, the Kistner court reversed a motion of summary
judgment for the debt collector and sent the issue of whether the language
289
of the collection letter was false, misleading, or deceptive to the jury.
The sole issue was whether the letter was susceptible to a reasonable
interpretation by the least sophisticated consumer that it was from an
attorney. 290 The Kistner court stated that a jury should hear the case
because "the impression left by the collection letter in this case falls
somewhere in between [a clear violation and a clear nonviolation of
29
§ 1692e(3)]." 1

283. Id.
284. See generally Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 646 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(approving the settlement).
285. Id. at 752.
286. 518 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2008).
287. Id. at 434-35, 438.
288. Id. at 435.
289. Id. at 441 ("[A] jury should determine whether the letter is deceptive and
misleading.").
290. Id.
291. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit also treats this issue as a question of fact. 292 In
Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc.,293 the debt collector sent Jeter two collection
letters stating that it would recommend legal action unless Jeter paid her
debt within five days. 294 After Jeter failed to respond, and no legal action
was taken by the debt collector, she sued the debt collector under various
provisions of the FDCPA, including § 1692e(5) and (10).295 In analyzing
her claim, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "[W]e are confident that whether the
'least sophisticated consumer' would construe Credit Bureau's letter as
deceptive is a question for the jury." 296 The Jetercourt provided no reasons

for this confidence, stating simply that this issue was one of material fact
and was inappropriate for summary judgment. 29 7 The Jeter court did
mention Sibley in a footnote, noting that Sibley allowed for jury trials in
298
FDCPA actions.
In 2009, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Jeter did not require all FDCPA
§ 1692e(1O) cases to go to the jury; rather, if there were "two sets of
reasonable inferences that could be drawn from a dunning letter, and one set
of inferences would result in a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10), while the
other would not, it was appropriate for a jury to decide which set of
inferences to draw." 299 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit seems to maintain the
position outlined in the Jeter decision.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida expressly
distinguished the Eleventh Circuit's approach from the Second Circuit's, a
discussion that brings this circuit split to the forefront. 300 When faced with
the plaintiffs § 1692e(5) and (10) claims, the court in Rivera v.
Amalgamated Debt Collection Services 30 1 noted that various district courts
in the Second Circuit had been presented with many cases involving similar
language in collection letters, and all cases had been resolved in favor of the
debt collector on summary judgment. 30 2 Despite this series of similar
cases, the Rivera court stated that it could not "ignore Jeter" and held that
the § 1692e(5) and (10) claims must be resolved by the trier of fact. 30 3
292. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1176-78 (1lth Cir. 1985); see also
Kuehn v. Cadle Co., 335 F. App'x 827, 830 (1 1th Cir. 2009).
293. 760 F.2d 1168.
294. Id. at 1171.
295. Id. at 1171-72.
296. Id. at 1177-78.
297. Id. at 1176.
298. Id. at 1176 n.7.
299. Kuehn v. Cadle Co., 335 F. App'x 827, 830 (1 1th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jeter, 760
F.2d at 1176).
300. Rivera v. Amalgamated Debt Collection Servs., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230-32

(S.D. Fla. 2006).
301. 462 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2006).

302. Id. at 1230-31.
303. Id. at 1231.

The Rivera v. Amalgamated Debt Collection Services, Inc. court

decided the plaintiffs § 1692g claims as a matter of law; therefore a jury trial on the
§1692e(5), (10) claims was unnecessary, though it could be used to support the plaintiffs
damages theory. Id. at 1228-31.
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While the Fifth Circuit had traditionally viewed the application of the
least sophisticated consumer standard to the language of a debt collection
letter as a question of law, in 2009 it abruptly reversed its position. 30 4 In
Gonzalez v. Kay, 30 5 the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a collection letter
sent by an attorney debt collector that contained an express disclaimer of
attorney involvement. 30 6 While courts had interpreted § 1692e(3) to require
that all attorney debt collectors be professionally involved in the decision to
send a collection letter to a debtor, 30 7 four years earlier, in Greco v.
Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P, 30 8 when faced with a similar case, the
Second Circuit granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the debt
collector. 30 9 This was because the disclaimer was located on the front of a
brief letter and "prominently stated" that no attorney was involved with the
account. 3 10 In Gonzalez, there was no dispute as to the attorney's
involvement, as the attorney conceded he had no involvement in reviewing
the debtor's file or in sending the letter; however, the disclaimer was
located on the back of the letter.3 11 The sole issue was whether the
language in the collection letter would mislead the least sophisticated or
unsophisticated (the Fifth Circuit has not officially taken a stance)
consumer into thinking the letter was from an attorney. 312 Instead of
issuing a ruling as a matter of law, the Gonzalez court sent the case to the
district court for a jury trial, because "reasonable minds can differ as to
whether this letter is deceptive." 3 13 The Gonzalez court followed the result
of a district court in the Eleventh Circuit, which in Brazierv. Law Offices of

304. See Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter. Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 494-96 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that certain representations in a collection letter were false, deceptive, or misleading
to the least sophisticated consumer in violation of § 1692e(10), but other representations
were not confusing); Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 350, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding (in part) that certain representations in a collection letter were not false or
misleading to the least sophisticated consumer under § 1692e, but the collection letter
envelope would mislead an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer and therefore
violated § 1692e(14)); McKenzie v. E.A. Uffman and Assocs. Inc., 119 F.3d 358, 362 (5th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the least sophisticated consumer would infer that the debt collector
was employed by a credit reporting agency, in violation of § 1692e(16)). Perhaps relying on
the Fifth Circuit's position, in an unpublished opinion, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas declared, "It is well settled that the issue whether a collection
letter violates the FDCPA is a matter of law for the Court to decide." Cash v. Allied
Interstate, Inc., No. H-04-0932, 2005 WL 1186189, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 18, 2005) (citing

Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 1997)).
305. 577 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1505 (2010).
306. Id. at 601-02.
307. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
308. 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005).
309. Id. at 366.
310. Id. at 361-62.
311. Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 602.
312. Id. at 604-07; see also supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
313. Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 607. The majority highlighted the fact that the disclaimer was
on the back of the letter as part of its reasoning. Id. at 606-07.
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Mitchell N. Kay P.C.,3 14 considered a letter containing "virtually identical"
language. 3 15 The court in Brazier noted that the issue of whether a
collection letter was confusing and contradictory was "a question of
316
interpretation and fact, not a pure legal question."
The dissenting opinion in Gonzalez made it clear that this was a break
from circuit precedent when it said, "Never before has this Court suggested
that the legal import of the language of a debt collection letter should be
ruled on by a jury." 317 Though never explicitly stating its opinion, the Fifth
3 18
Circuit had previously "assumed" that this issue was a matter of law.
The thorough dissenting opinion in Gonzalez provided four reasons why
this issue should be a question of law. First, the unsophisticated consumer
standard is an objective, hypothetical one; thus, it is not necessary to
determine if anyone was actually deceived. 3 19 Second, survey evidence
recommended by the Seventh Circuit will needlessly increase the time and
expense of many FDCPA litigations and will allow both parties to "present
a parade of expert witnesses." 320 Third, judges "historically are capable of
applying objective standards to undisputed facts." 32 1 Further, interpreting
written instruments such as contracts, letters, and statutes "is the
quintessential work of judges-not juries. ' 322 Finally, since debt collectors
often send the same form letter to thousands of people around the country,
the court's decisions provide predictability as to a letter's deceptiveness and
legality. 32 3 Since the FDCPA is a federal statute, it is particularly important
to ensure courts are uniformly applying it across the country. 324 Sending

314. No. 8:08-cv-156-t-17MAP, 2009 WL 764161 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2009).
315. Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 605-06.
316. Brazier, 2009 WL 764161, at *3.
317. Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 610 (Jolly, J., dissenting). "[T]he majority departs from our
precedent by referring the case to a jury for the determination of [the collection letter's]
legality." Id. at 612.
318. Id. at 610-11. The Fifth Circuit had previously sent the issue of determining
damages to a jury (after the judge specifically denied the defendant's arguments to send
liability on the § 1692e claim to the jury). See Johnson v. Eaton, 80 F.3d 148, 150 (5th Cir.
1996). However, this Note-and the dissent-focuses on the issue of liability, not damages.
319. See Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 611 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
320. Id.
321. Id. Judge E. Grady Jolly gives the example of probable cause cases, where a judge
must consider whether the circumstances known to a police officer at the time of the offense
would have caused a "'reasonably prudent person' to believe that an offense had been
committed." Id.(quoting Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg'I Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 330
F.3d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 2003)).
322. Id.; see also Carter Petrol. Prods., Inc. v. Bhd. Bank & Trust Co., 97 P.3d 505, 509
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004) ("Letters of credit are governed by the rules applicable to the
construction of ordinary contracts." (citing Sports, Inc. v. The Sportshop, Inc., 783 P.2d
1318, 1319 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989))).
323. Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 611 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 611-12; see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43
(1989) ("[Flederal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide application.").
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this issue to a jury, the dissent argued, will yield "ad hoc" results-even in
325
the same circuit-and therefore seriously undermine predictability.
Finally, according to the dissent, treating § 1692e disputes as factual
issues was inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit's treatment of § 1692g
disputes as issues of law. In the view of the dissent, "the inquiry is the
consumer interpret the language of a
same: how will an unsophisticated
326
debt collection letter."
C. The Seventh Circuit'sApproach-Generallya Question of Fact with
Extrinsic Evidence Required
1. Exploring the Requirement of Extrinsic Evidence
In contrast to the majority of circuits, the Seventh Circuit treats the issue
of whether the language contained in a collection letter is deceptive as a
question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact, typically the jury, under
all subsections of the FDCPA. 327 The Seventh Circuit distinguishes
between contradictory language, which a judge can decide, and confusing
language, which juries are more competent to decide. 328 "[T]hese words
are not themselves the applicable rule of law; a court must inquire whether
the letter is confusing. . . . a letter may confuse even though it is not
329
internally contradictory."
In order to understand how an unsophisticated reader would react to a
collection letter, the Seventh Circuit requires evidence in the form of
surveys--or their equivalent-similar to those used to measure confusion'33in1
trademark cases. 330 This is commonly known as "extrinsic evidence.
Also, similar to trademark cases, in order to prevail, a plaintiff must
325. Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 611 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 610 n.4.
327. Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999); see also
Elwin Griffith, The Peculiarityof Language in the Debt Collection Process: The Impact of
the FairDebt Collection Practices Act, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 673, 685 (2008). However, the
court can decide this issue as a matter of law if a letter is clearly misleading or not
misleading. See infra Part II.C.2.
328. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1060; Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1997).
329. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1060.
330. Id. The principal issue in trademark infringement cases is the "[I]ikelihood of
confusion," which is treated as an issue of fact in the Seventh Circuit. Reed-Union Corp. v.
Turtlc Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 911-12 (7th Cir. 1996); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1985); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:12 (4th ed. 2009); James W. Soong, Definite
Confusion over Likely Confusion, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 823, 834 & n.85 (1997).
331. Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 415, 419 (7th Cir. 2005).
Notably, the Eighth Circuit, the only other circuit that uses the unsophisticated consumer
standard, does not require the plaintiff to submit extrinsic evidence. Lucas & Harrell, supra
note 16, at 234-35; see Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir.
2002) ("Our cases have not required a showing of actual confusion, and this comment [about
the survey evidence requirement in the Seventh Circuit] need not be addressed here."
(citation omitted)).
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establish that the language of the letters "unacceptably increase[d] the level
of confusion" 332 about a debtor's legal rights, for many unsophisticated
consumers might be confused even if the collection letters contained
nothing more than a statement of their balance and the required language
under the FDCPA. 3 33 Just as the unsophisticated consumer standard shields
the debt collector from unreasonable interpretations of collection letters,
extrinsic evidence "ensures" the prevention of such an outcome. 334 It also
"protects against the repudiated least-sophisticated-debtor standard slipping
in through the back door." 335 After extrinsic evidence that comports with
the principles of professional scientific research is admitted, the matter goes
to a jury to decide whether the language in the collection letter was
336
misleading.
In Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 337 Judge Richard A.
Posner provided additional support for the Seventh Circuit's position on
this issue:
The intended recipients of dunning letters are not federal judges, and
judges are not experts in the knowledge and understanding of
unsophisticated consumers facing demands by debt collectors. We are no
more entitled to rely on our intuitions in this context than we are in
deciding issues of consumer confusion
in trademark cases, where the use
338
of survey evidence is routine.
Objective proof is required in trademark cases to establish that consumers
were likely to be confused, and survey evidence is often utilized to achieve
this goal. 339 Surveys look at the relevant consumer audience to determine
whether there was a likelihood of confusion. 340 The appropriate target

332. Durkin, 406 F.3d at 415 (quoting Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057,
1060 (7th Cir. 1999)).
333. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1060.
334. Durkin, 406 F.3d at 423. Specifically, the unsophisticated consumer standard
ensures that "unrealistic, peculiar, bizarre, and idiosyncratic interpretations of collection
letters do not prevail." Id. Note that the least sophisticated consumer standard also shields a
debt collector from "bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices." See supra
notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
335. Durkin, 406 F.3d at 423. The Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc. court cited to
Judge Easterbrook's concurrence in Gammon v. GC Services Limited Partnership,which
stated that if showing a handful of misled debtors were enough, we would as a practical
matter be using the "least sophisticated consumer" doctrine. Id. (citing Gammon v. GC
Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1260 (7th Cir. 1994)). The basis for this statement is not
clear, especially considering the fact that the Fifth Circuit expressly refuses to distinguish
between the two standards, and the Eighth Circuit (which uses the unsophisticated consumer
standard) does not have an extrinsic evidence requirement. See supraPart 1.C.3.
336. See DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., No. 05 CV 3462, 2009 WL 901369, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 31, 2009).
337. 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007).
338. Id. at 776.
339. Id.; 4 McCARTHY, supra note 330, § 23:2.
340. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 330, § 32:158; Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in
Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 2020, 2036 (2005).
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group ranges from the specific audience of consumers who were exposed to
the plaintiff and defendant's trademarks to the consumer population as a
whole. 34 1 To prevail, a plaintiff must establish that an "appreciable
number" of reasonable buyers are likely to be confused by the similar
trademarks. 34 2 However, an appreciable number of confused consumers do
not have to reach a majority; the measurement for consumer confusion in
most trademark cases is "not . . . an exact science, but a calculated
343
estimate."
In a recent case, Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships,344 the Seventh Circuit
clarified when plaintiffs were expected to produce extrinsic evidence in
order to survive a motion for summary judgment. 34 5 According to the
court, suits that allege misleading or deceptive language "fall into three
distinctive categories." 346
The first category involves language or
statements that clearly are not misleading or deceptive. 34 7 In these cases,
the court refuses to look at extrinsic evidence. 348 Instead, it will grant
summary judgment to the defendant because, as a matter of law, no
reasonable unsophisticated debtor would be confused by the language in the
collection letter at issue. 349 One such example is White v. Goodman,350 in
which a collection letter contained a description of rights enjoyed by
Colorado residents. 351 The debtor alleged that this language implied that
non-Colorado residents do not enjoy such rights, but the circuit court
affirmed an order of summary judgment for the debt collector as a matter of
52
law. 3
The second category involves language or statements that possibly may
3 53
mislead the unsophisticated consumer, but are not plainly deceptive.
Claims falling into this category must be accompanied by extrinsic
evidence that establishes the language misleads a "substantial number" of
unsophisticated consumers of their legal rights 354 in order to proceed to trial
and avoid a motion for summary judgment. 355 This is because the court
requires more than the plaintiffs "self-serving testimony" that he was
341. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 330, § 32:159-:160.
342. Id.
343. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 330, § 23:2; Beebe, supra note 340, at 2037-38 (noting
that courts have found infringement where "as little as 15%, or even 8.5%, of the relevant
consumer population [was] confused" (footnotes omitted)).
344. 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2009).
345. Id. at 800-02.
346. Id. at 800.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.

350. 200 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2000).
351. Id. at 1020.
352. Id.
353. Ruth, 577 F.3d at 800.
354. Id.at 800, 801 & n.4 (quoting Williams v. OSI Educ. Servs., Inc., 505 F.3d 675, 678
(7th Cir. 2007)).
355. Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 422 (7th Cir. 2005).
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confused by a letter's language. 3 56 "[T]he mere possibility of merit does
357
not create a triable issue."
The third and final category concerns collection letters that clearly
contain misleading or deceptive language. 358 In these situations, the court
will grant summary judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff, and no
extrinsic evidence will be required. 359 An example is a letter that contains a
phone number that the debtor must call in order to receive a "current
balance. '360 This is an obvious violation under § 1692g, which states that a
collection letter must contain a clear statement of the total amount owed by
36 1
the debtor.
2. Criticisms of Extrinsic Evidence
The court in Evory emphasized that in order to be admissible, the survey
evidence must follow the standards of professional survey research stated in
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.362 While surveys are the "most useful sort"
of extrinsic evidence, 363 a plaintiff can get to trial by presenting other forms
364
of extrinsic evidence that are equivalent to a survey.
In practice, survey evidence and its equivalents have been difficult to use
to establish whether a given letter was misleading to an unsophisticated
consumer. Examples of survey evidence equivalents include expert
testimony (usually based on the survey itself) and "general statistical
evidence"; 365 however, experts cannot "offer opinions or legal conclusions
on issues that will determine the outcome of the case."' 366 Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit has not provided any guidance on how a plaintiff could
36 7
procure general statistical evidence.
356. Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir.
2000).
357. Durkin, 406 F.3d at 422.

358. Ruth, 577 F.3d at 801.
359. Id.
360. See generally Chuway v. Nat'l Action Fin. Servs. Inc., 362 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004).
361. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) (2006); see also Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948.
362. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007);

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert can only testify "if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case." FED. R. EvID. 702.
363. DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., Nos. 09-2016, 09-2249, 2010 WL 938025, at *2 (7th Cir.
Mar. 17, 2010).
364. See Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999).

365. Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., No. 00 C 4832, 2004 WL 725461, at *4 (N.D.
11.Mar. 31, 2004).
366. McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing
Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1994)).
367. Durkin v. Equifax Check Sews., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 2005). The court

suggested that the plaintiffs present statistics of the number of confusion-based calls Equifax
received from debtors inresponse to the collection letters but did not elaborate further. See
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As the following cases demonstrate, survey evidence is extremely
difficult to admit. Because of the implied credibility of an expert's opinion,
judges act as "gatekeepers" and exclude expert evidence when the potential
prejudice from the testimony outweighs the benefits contributed to the
plaintiffs case. 368 Thus, in McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 369 a case where
the plaintiff alleged that the language in a debt collection letter did not
adequately inform him of his rights under § 1692g, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois barred the plaintiffs expert report
because it was filled with "legal conclusions and inappropriate opinions"
instead of testimony about consumer confusion.370 In Hernandez v.
Attention, LLC,3 7 1 the court excluded plaintiffs survey evidence as
unreliable because it did not use a control group, took questions from the
attitudes towards debt
letter out of context, did not test for preexisting
372
size.
sample
inadequate
an
used
and
collectors,
In Jackson v. National Action Financial Services, Inc.,373 the court
completely excluded plaintiffs survey evidence, in part, because it focused
on participants with a high school education or less to try and satisfy the
unsophisticated consumer standard. 374 The Jackson court found that "[t]he
survey was not tailored to exclude individuals who are not consumers
within the meaning of the FDCPA" because the expert "should have
considered the definition of 'consumer' under the Act" instead of his
"unsupported assumptions" that such people are automatically
unsophisticated. 375 Finally, in Muha v. Encore Receivable Management,
Inc.,376 the court deemed plaintiffs survey evidence to be inadmissible
questions, rendering them
because (1) the plaintiffs lawyer drafted 37the
7
leading, and (2) there was no control group.
Although it is confusing to compile a list of requirements that survey
evidence must meet to be admissible, the various cases in the Seventh
Circuit provide some guidance. As previously mentioned, survey evidence
must comport with the professional standards broadly stated in Federal Rule

368. McCabe, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 595 (1993)).
369. 272 F. Supp. 2d 736.
370. Id. at 740. In McCabe v. Crawford & Co., the plaintiff was allowed to go to trial
because certain aspects of the letter were inappropriate as a matter of law. See McCabe, 272
F. Supp. 2d at 742-45. This concept is discussed supra at notes 358-61.
371. 429 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

372. Id. at 916-17. The survey included approximately forty respondents. Id. at 917 n.6.
373. 441 F. Supp. 2d877 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

374: Id. at 880-81.
375. Id. at 880.
376. 558 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2009).
377. Id. at 625-26 (noting that it was a "mistake" to allow the plaintiffs lawyer to draft
the survey questions). The court also noted that the survey did not adequately target
unsophisticated consumers; instead it chose average consumers, but this was of no
consequence because such a mistake only helps the defendant. Id. at 626-27.
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of Evidence 702.378
A survey must not contain any "[l]eading
381
questions," 379 clearly define all terms, 380 and include a control group.
Survey evidence cannot be too broad, and the expert must be able to explain
the methodology behind the data. 3 82 The particular debt collection letter at
issue in the case must be analyzed; the plaintiff cannot analyze similarly
worded letters. 383 The plaintiff must offer objective evidence, not
subjective expert "readability and design" testimony. 384 Finally, the survey
evidence (or equivalent) must clearly measure the level of consumer
confusion caused by the disputed language in the letter, contain a sufficient
385
sample size, and possess other measures designed to ensure objectivity.
These requirements have led two commentators to conclude that it is nearly
impossible for a plaintiff to provide persuasive, admissible survey
evidence. 386 Additionally, two commentators have stated that the survey
evidence requirement has led to "little financial incentive" for an attorney to
387
take an FDCPA case.
In a recent case, DeKoven v. Plaza Associates, Judge Posner recognized
that lawsuits under the FDCPA "have repeatedly come to grief' because of
fatal flaws in the plaintiffs' surveys. 388 After excluding yet another survey
(primarily because the control letter was confusing), Judge Posner
suggested that district courts "may want to consider exercising the clearly
authorized but rarely exercised option of appointing their own expert to
conduct a survey in FDCPA cases [under Federal Rule of Evidence

378. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
379. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 778 (7th Cir. 2007).
380. See id.
381. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
382. Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 421 (7th Cir. 2005).
383. Sims v. GC Servs. L.P., 445 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2006).
.384. Id. at 964. Similarly, the extrinsic evidence must establish consumer confusion, not
the legal expert's opinions and conclusions. McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d
736, 740-41 (N.D. Il1.2003).
385. Hernandez v. Attention, LLC, 429 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916-18, 917 n.6 (N.D. II. 2005).
The Hernandez v. Attention, LLC court implied that a sample size of forty was inadequate.
Id. at 917 n.6.
386. See Lucas & Harrell, supra note 16, at 246.
387. Id. at 247. Laurie A. Lucas and Alvin C. Harrell note that in trademark litigation,
the entity alleging the infringement has the financial incentive to produce extrinsic evidence,
presumably because of the possibility of a very high judgment. Id. In a trademark
infringement case, the plaintiff can recover (1) the defendant's profits resulting from the
infringement; (2) up to three times the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff; and (3) the
costs of the action. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). In "exceptional" cases, the court "may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." Id. Successful plaintiffs stand to
recover millions of dollars. See Watec Co., v. Liu, 403 F.3d 645, 654-56 (9th Cir. 2005)
(upholding an approximately $2.1 million remittitur in a trademark infringement case).
388. DeKoven v. Plaza Assocs., Nos. 09-2016, 09-2249, 2010 WL 938025, at *5 (7th Cir.
Mar. 17, 2010) (citing Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 625-26 (7th
Cir. 2009); Jackson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020-21 (N.D. Ill.
2006); Hemandez v. Attention, LLC, 429 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916-18 (N.D. II1.2005)).
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706(a)]. ' 389 The court-appointed expert would conduct the survey, and the
neutrality of the expert can be assured if the "parties' own experts . . .
nominate a third expert to be the court-appointed expert. '390 Judge Posner
implied that the cost of the expert would be borne by the plaintiff, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 706(b), as "defendants rarely conduct their own
surveys." 39 1 Judge Posner recognized that this decision is firmly within the
district court's discretion, and suggested this option to "improve judicial
understanding of survey methodology" and serve as "a possible alternative
' 392
to the often unedifying spectacle of a battle of party-appointed experts.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit itself has shown reluctance to impose a
survey evidence (or equivalent) requirement. In a concurring opinion to
Johnson, Judge Jesse E. Eschbach disagreed with the court's
39 3
recommendation that plaintiffs be required to submit survey evidence.
While concurring in the holding, he mentioned that the FDCPA was
designed to protect the average debtor, and expressed reservation that the
majority's "strong preference" for survey evidence would "gut the purposes
of the FDCPA. ' 394 This was because of the extra time and expense a
survey evidence hurdle would impose on the common debtor. 395 Even
providing for the fact that the FDCPA allows a successful plaintiff to
recover attorney's fees, Judge Eschbach believed that requiring expensive
survey evidence would make the cost of filing a suit exorbitant, and would
cause a "chill[ing]" effect that would remove the protection of the FDCPA
396
from many consumers.
III. THE COURTS SHOULD ALLOW THE JUDGE To INTERPRET THE
LANGUAGE OF COLLECTION LETTERS

Part III of this Note aims to provide a resolution to this circuit split. Part
III.A argues that claims arising under §§ 1692e and g should be treated with
consistency-handled uniformly as questions of law or fact. This is
because the core issue underlying both sections is the same: would the
389. Id. at *3-5 (citations omitted); see also FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (authorizing a court to
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection or on consent of the parties).
390. DeKoven, 2010 WL 938025, at *5.
391. Id. at *6; see also FED. R. EVID. 706(b) (providing that the parties in civil actions not
involving just compensation under the Fifth Amendment bear the cost of the court-appointed
expert, with the proportion determined by the court).
392. DeKuven, 2010 WL 938025, at *6.
393. Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (Eschbach,
J., concurring).
394. Id.
395. Id. Judge Jesse E. Eschbach cited two cases to support his claims: Tonka Corp. v.
Rose Art Indus., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 200, 210 n.10 (D.N.J. 1993) (stating that a pilot study
cost $7850 and a more extensive study would have cost an extra $29,000 to $36,000), and
Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch & Lowy, No. 90 Civ. 4464(DNE), 1991 WL 170734, at *19 n.15
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1991) (estimating that a proper survey in a trademark case would cost up
to $65,000).
396. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1063 (Eschbach, J., concurring).
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language contained in the collection letter mislead or deceive the least
sophisticated debtor? Part III.B argues that the Second and Ninth Circuits
use the correct approach because the policy factors overwhelmingly support
treating this issue as a question of law. This part concludes with the
argument that the Seventh Circuit's extrinsic evidence requirement to reach
trial is counter to the legislative intention behind the FDCPA and should be
abolished.
A. Claims Arising Under §§ 1692e and g Should Be Treatedwith
Consistency
Currently, some circuits treat collection letter interpretation claims
differently under §§ 1692e and g, even though both sections involve the
same core issue: how would the least sophisticated (or unsophisticated)
debtor interpret the language of the letter?397 When faced with such a
question, the Sixth Circuit treats § 1692g claims as matters of law, but
§ 1692e cases as matters of fact. 39 8 While the Fifth Circuit has not
explicitly taken a position regarding § 1692g claims, and though until
recently it seemed to treat § 1692e cases as questions of law, 399 it recently
(for the first time) sent a § 1692e claim to the jury. 40 0 Additionally, while
the Eleventh Circuit has not officially taken a position on the treatment of
§ 1692g claims, district court decisions have treated these claims as
questions of law, while binding circuit precedent treats § 1692e claims as
questions of fact. 40 1 Further complicating matters, the circuit courts do not
discuss the reasons for the differing treatment, instead simply sending close
§ 1692e cases to the jury.4 02 Although the precise test is different in both
cases, as § 1692g cases ask whether the language in a debt collection letter
overshadows or contradicts the required disclosures, while the test in
§ 1692e cases is whether the representations are false or misleading, 40 3 this
distinction is ultimately immaterial.
Sections 1692e and g bestow different rights upon the debtor; however,
both ultimately turn on the same issue: whether the least sophisticated (or
unsophisticated) debtor would be confused by the language of the letter.
Since § 1692g requires a debt collector to communicate effectively
statutorily required rights to the debtor, the essential question is whether the
letter conveyed these rights to the least sophisticated (or unsophisticated)
consumer (through a validation notice) without confusing him.4 04 This

397. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
398. See supra Part ILA, B.2.

399. See supra notes 236, 304 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 304-16 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 235, 292, 303 and accompanying text.

402. See supra notes 289, 297-98 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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question is answered by determining if other language in the letter-or40the
5
letter format itself-overshadowed or contradicted the validation notice.
Because both the least sophisticated and unsophisticated consumer tests
are hypothetical, judicially created standards, it follows that if the validation
notice is not overshadowed or contradicted by language contained
elsewhere in the letter, the least sophisticated or unsophisticated consumer
would not be confused about her rights. In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit
speculated that an unsophisticated consumer could be confused by nothing
more than a statement of the debt and validation notice. 40 6 However, this
approach completely ignores the purpose of § 1692g. If a validation
notice-that is not overshadowed or contradicted by language contained
elsewhere in the letter-could nevertheless confuse the least or
unsophisticated consumer, what would be the purpose behind creating
§ 1692g?
The required validation notice is taken directly from § 1692g, whose
words were deliberately chosen by Congress. 40 7 Since one of the primary
legislative purposes behind the FDCPA was to protect debtors from abuses
of the debt collection process 4 8-and the statement of consumer's rights
was deemed sufficiently important to be included in the FDCPA-it would
not make sense to assume that a properly conveyed validation notice can
nevertheless confuse the least sophisticated or unsophisticated debtor and
subject him to abuse. If there was evidence that debtors were being
confused even by the validation notice provided in § 1692g, Congress could
amend the statute to clarify the notice, an option it has chosen to avoid. To
circumvent this issue, the courts assume that a debtor is not confused by a
or contradicted by any other
validation notice that is not overshadowed
40 9
message contained in the letter.
Similarly, since § 1692e prevents a debtor from dealing with false,
deceptive, or misleading representations from a debt collector, the test to
find a violation is simply whether the least sophisticated (or
unsophisticated) consumer would be confused by a false, deceptive, or
misleading representation in the collection letter. 4 10 While not all cases
under § 1692e are limited to the four corners of the letter-such as when
there is a factual dispute over whether the attorney was minimally involved

405. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5)
(2006).
408. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
409. The only exception is the Seventh Circuit, the only circuit that treats § 1692g
violations as questions of fact and requires evidence of actual consumer confusion. See supra
Part II.C.
410. See supra Part I.C.
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in sending the collection letter 4' 1-in many cases the only issue
is whether
4 12
the language itself contains false or misleading representations.
Even if a jury determines liability in such a case, it reaches a verdict
simply by analyzing the text of the letter itself to see if it contains any false
or misleading representations (except in the Seventh Circuit), without
extrinsic evidence. 4 13 Just as the courts assume that a properly conveyed
validation notice will not confuse the least sophisticated (or
unsophisticated) consumer, they can assume that a false, misleading, or
deceptive representation will confuse the debtor without evidence of actual
confusion. 4 14 Consequently, the same issue lies behind both §§ 1692e and
g cases: whether the language of a debt collection letter itself would
confuse the least sophisticated or unsophisticated debtor. Given this, there
is no reason for some circuits to treat claims arising under § 1692g as
questions of law and § 1692e as questions of fact. When the language of
the collection letter itself is at issue, a violation is determined solely on the
text of the collection letter. Consequently, the sections should be treated
415
alike.
B. A Question ofLaw Is the CorrectApproach
There are several important policy factors to consider when classifying
an issue as a question of law or fact. Examples include the force of federal
constitutional provisions preserving the right to a jury trial in a civil suit,
the relative competence of the judge or jury to decide a specific application
of law, and the uniformity and predictability of the result that occurs when a
judge applies the law-and the lack thereof when a jury is entrusted with
law application. 4 16 This section applies these factors to FDCPA cases in
which the decision maker must interpret the language of a collection letter,
starting with the most important consideration in such cases: the uniformity
and predictability of the outcome.

411. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
412. See supra Part II.B.1.

413. See supra Part II.B.2. Note that a jury would only become involved in the circuits
that have created the split, namely the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits.
414. Part III.B infra will explain why a judge can determine if a representation is false,
misleading, or deceptive.
415. There is a possible exception in § 1692e(5) that prohibits a debt collector from (in
part) threatening to take action that is not intended to be taken, as intent generally cannot be
judged from the text of a letter alone. See supra text accompanying note 59. However, in a
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff can present the judge with the necessary
evidence that the debt collector never intended to take the threatened action, and for the
reasons discussed infra in Part II.B, these cases still should be heard by the judge.
416. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
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1. The Need for Uniformity and Predictability in FDCPA Cases Is
Paramount
As the FDCPA is a federal statute, it is important that it be applied
uniformly. 4 17 The logistics of the debt collection industry make this point
even more compelling. As the cases demonstrate, debt collectors typically
send the same form letter to debtors in many different states. Sending these
cases to a jury may yield conflicting verdicts on the same letter in the same
state. This is because what is deceptive or confusing to one jury might
seem exceedingly clear to another.
This problem is exacerbated in close cases, such as Gonzalez v. Kay,
where a disclaimer of attorney involvement was printed on the back of a
collection letter. 4 18 One can easily imagine one jury finding that an
attorney collection letter violates the FDCPA because the disclaimer is
buried in the middle of text or is on the back of the letter (the majority in
Gonzalez highlighted this fact). 4 19 Similarly, a jury might decide that the
disclaimer does not vitiate the false representation or impression that an
attorney was involved in sending the letter, a violation of § 1692e(3). On
the other hand, it is quite feasible for a jury to determine that even the least
sophisticated consumer is charged with reading the entire letter. Because
the disclaimer itself was clear, it arguably did inform the least sophisticated
consumer that an attorney was not involved in the letter selection process.
Therefore, another jury might find that there was no false representation of
attorney involvement in the case, as a simple reading would alleviate any
confusion on the debtor's part.
Such conflicting results are unfair to both debt collectors-who under
this approach will have no way of knowing the legality of their collection
letters-and debtors, who would similarly not know what to expect if they
decided to pursue an FDCPA claim. Compounding this problem is the fact
that juries are not allowed to know the results that prior juries have reached
with similar facts. 420 Therefore, ad hoc decisions seem inevitable. This is
highly undesirable when dealing with a statute that affects so many. The
third-party debt collection industry collects over $50 billion a year, and
42 1
FDCPA claims have skyrocketed 217% in the past three years alone.
4
22
Judicial decisions, on the other hand, do create precedent, a necessary
element in providing predictability to all parties, which is highly desirable
in FDCPA litigation. Many cases alleging that the text of a collection letter
violated the FDCPA deal with similar factual situations, and some of them
417. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
419. See supra note 313.

420. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 8, 15 and accompanying text.

422. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Jury verdicts have no precedential
value. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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involve the exact same letter mailed out to numerous states. 423 This creates
an enormity of overlap between various claims, and an established body of
case law can better provide for an efficient and accurate disposition of many
cases. This would benefit debt collectors, who would cease the sending of
letters determined to be deceptive, as well as benefit debtors, who would
have a better understanding of the chances of an FDCPA suit.
Additionally, because judicial decisions are rendered far more quickly
than jury trials, the amount of time a deceptive or unlawful letter is being
distributed to debtors would be reduced if the case were decided by a
judge. 424 A debt collector is likely to immediately cease distribution of a
letter that has been deemed unlawful under the FDCPA. Sending the issue
to a jury needlessly increases the number of debtors exposed to a confusing
letter, as well as increases a debt collector's potential liability if he chooses
to continue sending the collection letter to other debtors prior to the
resolution of the lawsuit.
Permitting a judge to interpret a collection letter's language under
§§ 1692e and g allows this issue to be resolved at the summary judgment
stage, avoiding the need for trial, which is crucial to dealing with the
exploding trend in FDCPA litigation. 425 While there are many factors
behind this trend, including the economic recession and the growing ability
of debt collectors to reach millions, the explosion in FDCPA litigation
appears to be a trend that is here for the foreseeable future. 426 Given this

trend, it makes far more policy sense to enable courts to deal with such
issues on summary judgment, because jury trials are far more expensive and
time consuming. 427 Classifying this issue as a question of law will prevent
a potentially enormous burden on the judicial system, always an important
policy consideration.
2. Judges Are Capable of Applying Objective Standards to
Undisputed Facts
The Seventh Circuit holds that judges cannot determine what an
unsophisticated consumer would find confusing (if the violation is not
clear) because collection letters are intended for debtors, not federal
judges. 428 The Seventh Circuit therefore mandates that extrinsic evidence
be introduced to determine actual confusion.429

423. See supra notes 306-15 and accompanying text for an example of two virtually
identical letters from the same debt collector.
424. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 141.
426. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 327-38 and accompanying text.
429. See supra note 330-32 and accompanying text.

2010]

DEBT COLLECTION LETTERS

3155

However, judges routinely apply objective standards to undisputed facts,
such as in probable cause inquiries. 430 In such cases, judges determine if
the circumstances known to a police officer at the time of the offense (the
undisputed facts) would have caused a "reasonably prudent person" (the
objective standard) to believe an offense had been committed. 43 1 When
determining if the text of a collection letter is confusing, judges can
examine the text of the letter (the undisputed facts) to determine if the "least
sophisticated or unsophisticated consumer" (the objective standard) would
reasonably find it confusing. In § 1692g cases, this entails a finding that
certain messages overshadowed or contradicted the validation notice, and in
§ 1692e cases, it requires a finding that certain representations were false,
misleading, or deceptive. Given judges' routine application of objective
standards to undisputed facts, the criticism that judges are somehow not
capable of stepping into the shoes of an unsophisticated consumer is
unpersuasive.
The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have not disputed that judges are
capable of applying objective standards to undisputed facts, even while
concluding that whether an unsophisticated consumer would find a
collection letter confusing is an issue for the jury. 432 As this issue is a
matter of law application, and, according to the Supreme Court, the
decision whether to send an issue to judge or jury should be based on policy
factors, 433 at a minimum, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits should
articulate a rationale for allowing juries to interpret the language of
collection letters.
3. The Determination of a Violation Does Not Turn on the Credibility of
Extrinsic Evidence; Therefore, Resolution by a Judge Is Appropriate
The Ninth Circuit is correct in stating that its decision to treat the
interpretation of collection letters as a question of law is "buttressed" by the
rationale behind the de novo review of contracts and other written
instruments. 434 In those examples, when extrinsic evidence is not required,
a judge analyzes the contractual language, applies the principles of contract
4 35
interpretation, and determines the meaning of the written instrument.
Similarly, since the text of the collection letter is undisputed in FDCPA
cases where the letter speaks for itself, extrinsic evidence is not, and has not
been, required (except in the Seventh Circuit) to determine the letter's

430. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 321.
432. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 140, 144 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text. Although this position was
enunciated in a § 1692g case, subsequent district court decisions have extended this logic
§ 1692e cases. See supra notes 265-71 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
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meaning. 4 36 Although a collection letter is not a contract, interpreting
written instruments such as contracts, letters, and statutes is the typical
work of judges, not juries. 4 37 This is yet another factor weighing in favor of
allowing the judge to determine the legal import of a collection letter's
language.
Since the classification of the language of a collection letter is a matter of
law application, policy factors determine whether it should be a question of
law or fact. 4 38 Admittedly, the policy factors in favor of treating the issue
as a question of law have to be balanced against the strong policy favoring
the right to a jury trial in civil actions. 439 After all, the right to a jury trial in
civil actions is guaranteed in the Seventh Amendment. 4 40
Citizen
participation in the civil justice process is considered to be healthy for the
U.S. judicial system. 44 1 However, the aforementioned factors, especially
the need for the consistent application of a frequently litigated federal
statute, are sufficiently compelling to allow judges the task of applying the
law and outweigh the federal policy in favor of jury trials.
4. The Seventh Circuit's Requirement of Extrinsic Evidence Contradicts
the Intention of the FDCPA
The Seventh Circuit's requirement of extrinsic evidence to survive a
motion for summary judgment contradicts the purpose of the FDCPA,
which is (in part) to protect the average consumer from abusive debt
collection practices. 442 Surveys are typically very expensive, as is expert
testimony, with costs that can run into tens of thousands of dollars. 443 A
debtor is left with limited protection against abusive debt collection
practices if a successful case can cost tens of thousands of dollars to
produce, as many attorneys may be dissuaded from such an undertaking.
Further, as the cases demonstrate, it is very difficult for a survey (or expert
testimony) to be admitted into evidence, a hurdle which often causes the
plaintiff's case to be dismissed at the summary judgment level, sticking the
444
attorney with the bill.
Because of the requirement that admissible extrinsic evidence conform to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (primarily surveys), there are innumerable
barriers to the acceptance of survey evidence. 445 Examples include an
inadequate sample size (a group of forty people was considered
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 368-77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
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insufficient), leading questions on the survey, a failure to define clearly all
terms, and a failure to hire an objective party to formulate the survey
questions. 446 These barriers have led two commentators to state that
producing a persuasive and admissible survey is nearly impossible. 44 7 Even
if a survey can satisfy the court for purposes of proceeding past summary
judgment, the defendant has the option to hire its own expert to attack the
plaintiff's survey, potentially causing the jury to be subjected to a parade of
experts. 448
Clearly, the extrinsic evidence requirement dramatically
increases the time and expense associated with an FDCPA claim.
While the Seventh Circuit reasons that the extrinsic evidence requirement
is necessary to shield the debt collector from unreasonable interpretations of
collection letters-part of the unsophisticated consumer standard-this
"solution" is unduly harsh on the debtor. 449 A judge is surely capable of
spotting an "unrealistic, peculiar, bizarre, [or] idiosyncratic" interpretation
of a collection letter and can prevent the plaintiff from prevailing on such a
claim. 450 This has already been demonstrated by the numerous circuits that
follow the least sophisticated consumer standard, which also protects the
debt collector from "bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection
notices." 4 5 1 Judges are assigned this task in the majority of federal circuit
courts for § 1692g cases, 4 52 and judges in the Second and Ninth Circuits
perform this role in § 1692e cases as well. 4 53 Requiring extrinsic evidence
for this common-sense task simply adds unnecessary time and expense to
many FDCPA claims.
Another justification for an extrinsic evidence requirement cited by the
Seventh Circuit is that it "protects against the repudiated leastsophisticated-debtor standard slipping in through the back door."4 54 The
fear of allowing unworthy claims through the "back door" of the least
sophisticated consumer standard is a red herring, especially given the fact
that the Seventh Circuit has never cited a single example of an unreasonable
claim that slipped through the cracks using the least sophisticated consumer
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit-which employs the
standard.
unsophisticated consumer standard--does not have an extrinsic evidence
requirement and allows the judge to decide 1692g violations as a matter of
law. 4 55 This line of reasoning does not justify the massive burden an
extrinsic evidence requirement imposes on an FDCPA plaintiff.

446. See supra notes 378-85 and accompanying text.
447. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
448. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 225, 334 and accompanying text.
450. See supra note 334.

451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B. 1.
See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208, 235, 331 and accompanying text.
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The extrinsic evidence requirement turns FDCPA claims into a high-risk,
high-reward proposition for attorneys, which is certainly not what Congress
intended. 456 It thwarts the purpose behind providing reasonable attorney's
fees to a prevailing plaintiff, which is to persuade attorneys to take FDCPA
cases. 4 57 While it is true that egregious conduct will weigh in favor of the
plaintiff during summary judgment, the formidable task of producing an
expensive survey before trial even starts, the lengthy time commitment
associated with hiring an expert to formulate and administer the survey,
and, most importantly, the massive expenses that the plaintiffs attorney
will incur in the event of a loss are likely to dissuade many attorneys from
taking FDCPA cases, which will ultimately deter debtors from filing such
claims. Although one could argue that the costs of survey evidence will
simply amount to more work for the attorneys-and therefore a higher
attorney fee payout-the potential for loss is far greater than it would be
without this requirement. This means that attorneys in the Seventh Circuit
face a windfall in fees if they succeed, due to the increased time and
expense associated with the survey evidence, but the risk of a crippling
blow in the event of a loss.
The suggestion by Judge Posner for the trial judge to hire a courtappointed expert to conduct the survey represents a novel attempt to deal
with an increasingly unworkable standard, but fails to resolve any of its
major flaws. 4 58 While such an option might actually provide an FDCPA
plaintiff with a fighting chance of getting her survey admitted, this expert
will be selected through the mutual agreement of the parties' experts. 459
Since the cost of the expert will be borne by the plaintiff, this route will
impose yet another financial burden that debtors in any other circuit do not
have to bear, and will not alleviate any of the numerous other problems
associated with the extrinsic evidence requirement. 460 Since this option is
"rarely exercised," in the event a plaintiff forgoes hiring her own expert,
district courts likely would be reluctant to appoint an expert sua sponte. 46 1
If this practice became commonplace, it would likely overwhelm the district
courts, as they would have to appoint an expert for every credible FDCPA
claim. Under the Seventh Circuit's approach, the plaintiff is not presented
with any palatable options: she is either forced to hire a second expert at
her own expense, 462 forego hiring her own expert in the hopes that the court
will appoint one for her (thus placing a tremendous burden on district
courts), or wait to see whether the court will appoint an expert and risk
456. The intent of the FDCPA was to abolish many abusive practices employed by debt
collectors while also insuring that the collectors who did not engage in these tactics were not
at a disadvantage. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
457. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 388-92 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
460. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
461. See supra text accompanying note 389.
462. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
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having her case dismissed. Thus, the ability of a district court to appoint an
expert sua sponte will not alleviate the already significant flaws with the
Seventh Circuit's extrinsic evidence requirement.
Additionally, the financial motivation for trademark infringement
cases-the inspiration for the extrinsic evidence requirement-are very
different from those in FDCPA cases. In trademark cases, the entity
alleging the infringement has the financial incentive to produce extrinsic
evidence. 4 63 This is because a successful plaintiff can recover (1) the
defendant's profits resulting from the infringement; (2) up to three times the
464
actual damages sustained by the plaintiff; and (3) the costs of the action.
Millions of dollars are at stake. 465 In contrast, FDCPA cases only provide
for a maximum $1000 recovery, actual damages (which are rare), and
reasonable attorney's fees. 466 Although survey evidence is time-consuming
and expensive, attorneys in trademark infringement cases have a significant
financial incentive to pay for the surveys. With the exception of class
action lawsuits, FDCPA cases do not provide attorneys with a remotely
similar financial incentive to procure expensive survey evidence.
This could explain why the Seventh Circuit itself had reservations with
this requirement, as noted in Judge Eschbach's concurring opinion in
As Judge Eschbach foretold, the extrinsic evidence
Johnson.467
requirement will create a "chill[ing]" effect that removes the protection of
the FDCPA from many consumers. 468 He believed that requiring expensive
survey evidence would make the cost of filing a suit exorbitant and the
requirement would "gut the purposes of the FDCPA. ' ' 4 69 Judge Eschbach
was correct.
The FDCPA should be interpreted to protect consumers, not erect hurdles
to enforcement. The requirement of extrinsic evidence is a needless barrier
that contradicts the legislative intent behind the FDCPA, and is simply bad
policy.
CONCLUSION

Given the wide application of the FDCPA-and the recent exponential
increase in FDCPA litigation-it is essential that the FDCPA be uniformly
applied across the country. Since a substantial number of FDCPA cases
involve claims that the language in a debt collector's communication
violated the Act, the circuit split regarding the appropriate decision maker
463. See supra note 387.
464. See supra note 387.
465. See supra note 387.
466. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. However, class action suits permit
the attorney to recover the lower of $500,000 or one percent of the debt collector's net
worth. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
468. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
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impacts many Americans. As the third-party debt collection industry
collected over $50 billion in 2007 alone, and as creditors are increasingly
turning to third-party debt collectors, the impact of the choice between
judge and jury is substantial. The fair and legitimate resolution of debts
will be an important factor in resolving the national economic crisis.
Resolving the split by treating the interpretation of confusing or misleading
language in a collection letter as a question of law is a crucial step in the
right direction.

